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Words to Live By:
Public Health, the First Amendment, and
Government Speech
JESS ALDERMANt

INTRODUCTION
A young woman is waiting for a train in a subway station.
She notices an advertisement on the wall above the tracks. In bold
red and white letters against a black background, it warns,
'Women Who Choose Abortion Suffer More & Deadlier Breast
Cancer."' The state public transportation authority had received a
copy of a letter from a federal health agency stating that this
advertisement was misleading and scientifically inaccurate. 2 In
response,
the
transportation
authority
removed
the
advertisements, 3but a court later ruled that the removal was
unconstitutional.
A 15-year-old boy rides public transportation to school. One
morning as he boards a bus and looks for a seat, an advertisement
above the window catches his eye. Below a photograph of a teen
wearing a backwards baseball cap, it declares, "Smoking pot is not
cool, but we're not stupid, ya know. Marijuana is NOT cocaine or
heroin. Tell us the truth . . . . -4 The transportation authority
initially had refused to run this advertisement, claiming that it
was concerned that the message could mislead teenagers into

t Research Assistant Professor, University at Buffalo School of Public Health &
Health Professions, State University of New York. B.A. Wellesley College, M.D.
University of California at San Francisco School of Medicine, J.D. Harvard Law
School. The author is grateful to Richard A. Daynard, Martha T. McCluskey,
and Sarah G. Vincent for their comments and suggestions. Many thanks to John
Druar for his support and encouragement during the writing of this article.
1. Christ's Bride Ministries, Inc. v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 148 F.3d 242, 245
(3d Cir. 1998).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 242.
4. Ridley v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 390 F.3d 65, 73 (1st Cir. 2004).
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believing that marijuana is relatively harmless. 5 A skeptical court
believed that the real reason for the refusal
was that the state
6
disapproved of the legalization of marijuana.
A couple is riding the subway with their young child. An
advertisement across from their seats features a picture of a
condom and asks, "Haven't you got enough to worry about in
bed?"7 The transportation authority had declined to accept these
advertisements because it was concerned about exposing children
to sexual content and offending a trapped audience of riders.8
Citing numerous public health officials' support for its approach,
the AIDS advocacy group that produced the advertisements asked
a court to prevent the transportation authority from refusing to
display them.9

For at least two centuries, the American legal system
has recognized that the government is charged with the
protection of public health. 10 Despite the government's
considerable power to act on behalf of citizens' well-being,
the United States Constitution limits government action
when it infringes on constitutional rights such as the
protection of free speech guaranteed by the First
Amendment. How should courts evaluate situations that
involve both public health and free speech? In many cases,
simply adding the government's own viewpoint to a debate
about health issues is not a satisfactory solution. Should
the state's reason for limiting speech matter in a court's
First Amendment analysis? Should the government have a
greater ability to control false speech that may be
mistakenly attributed to it, particularly when the message
could potentially harm public health? What should courts
do when the government's duty to protect public health
gives it a motivation to suppress truthful as well as false
information? What if the state has a reason for suppressing
health information that is unrelated to its own duty to
safeguard health? Such questions imply that courts need to
consider more fully the public health implications of their
decisions in free speech cases.
5. Id. at 82-83.
6. Id. at 87-90.
7. AIDS Action Comm. of Mass. v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 42 F.3d 1, 4 (1st
Cir. 1994).
8. Id. at 5.
9. Id. at 5-6.
10. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 203 (1824).
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Some legal scholarship has examined the First
Amendment and government speech, and other work has
explored the government's role in promoting public health,
but few scholars have sought to integrate the two outside
the narrow context of abortion. This Article seeks to fill this
gap, establishing connections to existing scholarship by
exploring how courts can consider the public health
ramifications of free speech analysis. It does not suggest
that traditional free speech models should be altered nor
that public health is more important than free speech;
rather, it seeks to integrate public health concerns into
established free speech doctrine.
The scenarios above involve public health, free speech,
and the role of the government in promoting or suppressing
each. Judges often perform First Amendment analysis
without fully considering the public health implications of
their decisions. For example, if listeners attribute others'
health speech to the government, this misperception can
undermine the government's ability to protect public
health. On the other hand, the government should not be
able to use public health protection as a shield against First
Amendment accountability. How should courts reconcile the
government's need to send effective health messages with
its potential for speech market domination? This discussion
explains that, following established precedent, courts may
give the government both more and less power as a public
heath speaker. The government can and should have more
power to dissociate itself from messages that conflict with
or undermine its own. At the same time, courts can limit
the government's ability to distort the speech market or
mislead the public by suppressing the viewpoints of other
speakers.
This Article identifies three general categories of speech
and health cases, represented by the three scenarios above,
that illustrate how better to protect public health without
compromising free speech. In the first category, as in the
abortion advertisement example, the First Amendment
appears to present a barrier to the government's duty to
protect the public. Seeking to promote public health, the
government attempts to avoid the appearance of endorsing
false or harmful viewpoints. In such cases the government
might find that others' messages undermine the integrity of
its own. This first category presents a direct conflict
between public health and free speech.
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In the second category, illustrated by the marijuana
advertisement, the government resists another's viewpoint
not because it is false or misleading but despite the fact
that it is truthful or informative. In cases like these, the
government seems to be violating the First Amendment by
limiting the availability of complete health information.
Free speech and public health may be aligned in some
ways, but the government still has other interests, such as
protecting children from harmful messages, that courts
must consider in their analysis. Finally, in the third
category, as in the situation with the condom
advertisement, the government may attempt to restrict
others' health-related speech for a reason unrelated to its
own duty to protect public health. As in the AIDS
awareness example, the reason is often to avoid controversy
or offense. In this type of situation, free speech and public
health values tend to be more easily aligned.
This discussion will consider each of these three types
of cases as it examines how courts in First Amendment
cases tend to disregard the effect of government speech on
public health. Scientific information can be particularly
difficult for listeners to evaluate, so they will turn to
sources they trust for information. Because the government
is empowered to regulate and promote health, can expend
vast resources, and has historically played a central role in
the promotion of health, government speech has a uniquely
powerful influence on public health. However, the
government's role in protecting public health can conflict
with or complicate free speech considerations. If free speech
and public health are conceptualized not as competing
values but rather as values that further the same ultimate
goals, such as self-realization, the government should have
an interest in preserving both. A public health perspective
enriches First Amendment analysis by considering multiple
factors that impact citizens' ability to make free and
informed choices.
Part I of this Article will provide readers with relevant
legal background about both public health and First
Amendment law. Part II will discuss the problems that
health-related speech poses in a speech market and the
unique role of government as a speaker in this context. Part
III will explain the need for the government to avoid
mistaken attribution of others' messages to itself and
analyze specific examples of others' speech undermining the
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government's own health message or goals. Part IV will
explore how speech can create and influence both health
decisions and the environment in which they are made.
Part V will examine the problems with government control
over health speech by providing specific examples of market
distortion and deception. Finally, Part VI will consider
situations in which the government's myriad other
functions can impede both public health and free speech.
I. A BRIEF SUMMARY OF RELEVANT LEGAL DOCTRINE
A. Public Health
The U.S. Constitution grants states "police powers" to
legislate in areas not specifically designated to the federal
government. These powers include the ability to pass
"health laws of every description" to protect the public
health, safety, and morals. 1 ' Further, states may infringe
on the rights of citizens and restrict their behavior to
protect the public health. 12 The federal government
typically derives its authority to pass health laws from the
Commerce Clause, which grants Congress the power to
"regulate Commerce . . . among the several States.' 13
Another source of federal power is the ability to "lay and
collect Taxes . . . to pay the Debts and provide for the

common Defence and general Welfare of the United
States."'14 Based on this "spending power," the Supreme
Court has held that the federal government may further its
goals, particularly public health objectives, by conditioning
the receipt of federal money on compliance with15 federal
mandates that seek to promote the general welfare.

11. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905).
12. Wendy E. Parmet et al., Individual Rights Versus the Public's Health100 Years After Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 352 NEw ENG. J. MED. 652 (2005).

13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.

15. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65-66 (1936). One example is
requiring all states receiving federal highway funds to raise the legal drinking
age to twenty-one. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
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B. Free Speech
The First Amendment states that "Congress shall make
no law
. . . abridging the freedom of speech."'16 This
amendment has since been incorporated into the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, making it
applicable to the states as well. 17 Because freedom of speech
is a fundamental right, the government can infringe on it
only in limited circumstances. The methods that courts use
to analyze constraints on free speech depend on the type of
forum in which the speech occurs. Traditional public fora
are streets, sidewalks, and parks, which "have immemorially
been held in trust for the use of the public ... for purposes
of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and
discussing public questions.' 8 In these spaces, the
government can regulate speech in some reasonable ways,
but it may not prohibit their use for speech purposes. 19
A designated public forum is public property that the
government has opened to speech. 20 The government is not
required to open non-traditional fora for speech purposes,
but once it does so, it is bound by the same restrictions on
governmental limitation of speech that apply in traditional
public fora. 21 The exclusion of speakers from public fora
may not be based on the content of the speech. 22 If the
government does impose content-based regulations, it must
demonstrate that the regulations are necessary to further a
compelling government interest. 23 The government can
impose content-neutral "time, place, and manner" regulations
if they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government
interest and alternative channels of communication remain
open. 24

16. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
17. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); see also Fiske v. Kansas, 274
U.S. 380 (1927).
18. Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
19. Id. at 515-16.
20. Kaplan v. County of Los Angeles, 894 F.2d 1076, 1080 (9th Cir. 1990).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1079-80. This standard is known as "strict scrutiny."
24. Id. at 1080.
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A "non-public forum" is government property that is
25
neither a traditional nor a designated public forum.
Although a non-public forum is public property, the
government can prohibit its use for speech. 26 The public may
be freely invited, although not for expressive purposes.2 7 In
such a forum, the government can discriminate among
speakers and messages if it does so in a viewpoint-neutral
manner and if the discrimination is reasonable in light of
the purposes of the forum. 28 It is sometimes confusing to
distinguish between content and viewpoint discrimination.
Banning all political speech is an example of content
discrimination; it would not be permitted in a public forum
absent a compelling reason, but it could be permitted in a
non-public forum. Banning only the speech of one political
party is viewpoint discrimination and would not be
permitted in either type of forum.
In general, private spaces are not subject to the First
Amendment, which confers rights against the government
rather than against private parties. Citizens usually may
restrict speech on their own property, especially if they
have not opened it to the public. 29 In addition, certain
classes of speech are afforded less protection than others.
Commercial speech, "expression related solely to 30the
economic interests of the speaker and its audience," is
protected under the First Amendment, but to a lesser
25. Id. The term "non-public forum" is a misnomer because, although not an
open forum, it is public space; a more accurate term would be "public nonforum." Despite this imprecision, this article will use "non-public forum"
because it is the widely accepted terminology.
26. Id.
27. See id.
28. Id. The term 'limited public forum" is frequently but inconsistently used.
Sometimes it is used to mean "designated public forum" and other times to
mean "non-public forum." See, e.g., Ridley, 390 F.3d at 76 n.4. To avoid
confusion, this article will not use the term.
29. See, e.g., Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 513 (1976) ("It is, of course, a
commonplace [notion] that the constitutional guarantee of free speech is a
guarantee only against abridgment by government, federal or state.. . . Thus,
while statutory or common law may in some situations extend protection or
provide redress against a private corporation or person who seeks to abridge the
free expression of others, no such protection or redress is provided by the
Constitution itself.").
30. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561
(1980).
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degree than other kinds of speech. 31 Because this Article
focuses on non-commercial speech, a detailed summary of
commercial speech doctrine is beyond the scope of this
discussion. 32 Finally, the First Amendment does not protect
obscenity, fighting words, child pornography, defamation, or
incitement to illegal activity,3 3 so the government may
regulate or proscribe these kinds of speech without
constitutional limitation.

II. PUBLIC HEALTH AND GOVERNMENT SPEECH

A. Free Speech and Scientific Data
The premise underlying First Amendment jurisprudence
is that all views should have an equal chance to compete in
a "marketplace of ideas," so it is particularly important to
keep channels of communication open to all. 34 When all
ideas are presented and compared, the best ideas will
endure and be endorsed by others. As Justice Brandeis
famously said, "If there be time to expose through
discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by
the processes of education, the
remedy to be applied is more
'35
speech, not enforced silence.

31. Id. at 563.
32. Recently there has been much scholarship about commercial speech and
public health. The rationale behind protecting commercial speech-that its
purpose is to communicate information to consumers-is becoming increasingly
less true in the current atmosphere of building brands and associating products
with certain lifestyles. As advertisements focus more on image, they convey less
information about the products they attempt to sell. Given that the advertising
of powerful industries can have a detrimental effect on public health and that
advertising targeted at children has grown exponentially in recent decades,
many public health advocates have asserted that commercial speech should be
afforded significantly less First Amendment protection. See, e.g., Wendy E.
Parmet & Jason A. Smith, Free Speech and Public Health: A Population-Based
Approach to the First Amendment, 39 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 363 (2006); David G.
Yosifon, Resisting Deep Capture: The Commercial Speech Doctrine and JunkFood Advertising to Children,39 LOY.L.A. L. REV. 507 (2006).
33. See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 504 (1984).
34. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
35. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,
concurring).

377 (1927)

(Brandeis, J.,
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In reality, ideas cannot always compete this way
because listeners often lack sufficient knowledge to
evaluate them fairly. The more sophisticated the analysis,
the more difficult it becomes for listeners to link cause and
effect and make judgments about the validity of speech. For
example, can a state's economic problems be blamed on the
current governor's policies? Though it may be an objective
fact that they occurred during the governor's tenure, one
would need detailed information about economics and
politics to make an educated determination. The free flow of
information can enhance listeners' abilities to understand
complex problems, but it also can result in frustration and
alienation if listeners are unable to evaluate competing
arguments.
This problem is particularly significant when speech
conveys scientific information. When a speaker makes a
scientific statement, it can be difficult to evaluate its worth.
Is it merely the speaker's opinion or a scientific consensus?
The information needed to evaluate scientific claims is often
neither accessible nor comprehensible to most participants
in a general speech market. The consequence is that the
balance of power shifts in favor of those with scientific
expertise and leaves the public vulnerable to manipulation
by those with social or political agendas disguised as
scientific data. This problem overshadows discussion of
public health and the First Amendment. The voluminous
amount of health advice available on the internet-some
scientifically sound and some quite dubious-means that
consumers are faced with an abundance of undecipherable
health information. Many patients might seek the advice of
their individual physicians or consult private medical
websites. It is likely that many citizens will also expect
governmental health agencies to provide guidance and
clarification.
B. The Role of Government in Health Speech
In the non-commercial context, government speech has
a tremendous influence on public health. First, the
government is uniquely charged with public protection; it
alone possesses the power to regulate and promote health.
Second, the government is positioned to marshal vast
resources for public health purposes. Also, historically the
government has played a principal role in developing public
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health policy and disseminating public health information.
For these reasons, the government's voice carries a special
weight in the public health context.
Other opinions certainly also matter in debates about
health issues. For example, private medical websites and
the opinions of major professional organizations like the
American Medical Association play a role in shaping public
opinion. Patients typically ask their own doctors for specific
health advice, but such interactions tend to be infrequent,
brief, and limited to the most immediately pressing issues.
Accustomed to government involvement in health issues,
many people turn to the government for more general
health information and assume that it will monitor
potential health risks and warn the public of danger.
Citizens expect the Food and Drug Administration to
monitor drug safety, state medical licensing boards to
ensure the quality of their doctors and nurses, reports of
the Surgeons General to educate them about health issues,
their local Board of Health to ensure that local restaurants
are safe, Congress to struggle with health care reform, and
all branches of government to respond to a pandemic.
Government speech plays a critically important role in
shaping public perception of health-related issues.
III. THIS IS YOUR GOVERNMENT SPEAKING: A MATTER OF
ATTRIBUTION

A. Government as Speaker
Although the government does not itself possess rights
under the First Amendment,3 6 it is well-established that
the government can choose and communicate its own
message 37 to maintain its cohesion and functioning. It is
less clear to what extent the government can limit others'
speech to delineate the parameters of its own speech and
prevent mistaken attribution of another's message to the
government. As Helen Norton explains,
36. Randall P. Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many Faces of Government
Speech, 86 IowA L. REV. 1377, 1502 (2001).

37. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S.
819, 833 (1995); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884
(1992); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991).
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[A] government's justifiable efforts to inform and persuade the
public of its affirmative views are too easily undermined if [it]
cannot take dissociative action to ensure that private opinions are
not erroneously attributed to it. The more formidable challenge...
is determining whether such government actions are a pretext for
censoring private speech or are instead spurred by a sincere and
reasonable concern that others' 38
speech will be mistakenly
understood as the government's own.

Norton suggests that, to the extent that the government
is politically accountable for its message, the government
should be able to control its own message by dissociating
itself from others' speech.3 9 In the public health context,
this concept might expand to encompass situations where
the government is not just politically accountable but also
responsible for protecting the public. In such situations, the
government has a heightened interest in preserving the
integrity of its message.
One way to view the government's power to separate
itself from others' speech is to recognize that, by selecting
among various speakers, the government is itself engaged
in speech whose message would be suppressed if it were
forbidden to engage in viewpoint discrimination. 40 When
the government simply provides a forum for the expression
of a wide variety of views, it does not seek to send a
particular message of its own, but when it engages in a
selection process, it may be attempting to communicate (or
not communicate) a specific set of ideas or values. In such a
situation, the practical effect of limiting viewpoint
discrimination is restriction of governmental speech.
Further, if the government were not permitted to
discriminate, it might choose not to open a particular forum
to speech, which would undermine overall speech
opportunities. As the Supreme Court has observed, "we
encourage the government to open its property to some
expressive activity in cases where, if faced with an41all-ornothing choice, it might not open the property at all."
38. Helen Norton, Not for Attribution: Government's Interest in Protecting
the Integrity of Its Own Expression, 37 U.C. DAvIS L. REV. 1317, 1326 (2004).

39. Id.
40. Leslie Gielow Jacobs, The Public Sensibilities Forum, 95 Nw. U. L. REV.
1357, 1375 (2001).

41. Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 680 (1998).
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It is easier for the government to control its message if
a court finds that the government itself is speaking; when
the government speaks, it may exclude others' messages. In
Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Curators of University of
Missouri, the Ku Klux Klan ("KKK") sought to become a
local sponsor of the public radio program "All Things
Considered," which would have required the program
announcer to read a sponsor acknowledgment of its
contribution. 42 The Eighth Circuit held that sponsor
acknowledgments were governmental editorial expression
not subject to forum analysis, allowing the public university
radio station to decline the sponsorship. 43 Likewise, in
American Civil Liberties Union of Tennessee v. Bredesen,
the Sixth Circuit held that it was constitutional for the
state to issue specialty license plates saying "Choose Life"
when no alternative pro-choice plates were available
because the plates were state speech; the state was simply
enlisting volunteers to disseminate its chosen message. 44
The government has less control over messages when
the court finds that the government is limiting mixed
private/governmental speech or private speech. In contrast
to the Sixth Circuit, the Fourth Circuit has held that a
"Choose Life" specialty license plate is mixed governmental
and private speech, so it is unconstitutional viewpoint
discrimination for the state to offer it without also offering
a pro-choice plate. 45 In another case, the Fourth Circuit
found that the state could not ban the Confederate flag on

42. 203 F.3d 1085, 1089-90 (8th Cir. 2000).
43. Id. at 1086.
44. 441 F.3d 370 (6th Cir. 2006).
45. Planned Parenthood of S.C., Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 795, 799 (4th Cir.
2004). While Rose found that specialty license plates were a 'limited forum,"
Bredesen held that the plates were not a forum for expression. Bredesen, 441
F.3d at 370; Rose, 361 F.3d at 786, 798. This discrepancy in forum
determination in two cases that seem factually indistinguishable suggests an
inherent problem with the reliability and predictability of forum analysis. See
infra note 90.
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specialty plates designed by the Sons of Confederate
46
Veterans because in that context the speech was private.
Courts differ on the extent to which they will allow the
government to dissociate itself from others' messages due to
fear of attribution, and the outcome often depends on the
type of forum analysis performed. In Texas v. Knights of the
Ku Klux Klan, the Fifth Circuit addressed the state's adopta-highway program. 47 The KKK sought to adopt a stretch of
Texas highway, but the state argued that it would frustrate
the use of highways, interfere with desegregation, and
intimidate residents of a nearby housing project. 48 The
court held that the highway program was a non-public
forum and that the state's exclusion of the KKK was
reasonable in light of the purposes of the forum given the
state's reasons for doing so. 49 It also found that the
exclusion was viewpoint neutral because the purpose was to
prevent the problems50 the state articulated, not to exclude
the KKK's viewpoint.
In contrast, dealing with a similar fact pattern in
Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Arkansas State Highway
and TransportationDepartment, a federal district court in
Arkansas found the adopt-a-highway program to be a public
forum whose point was to advertise good citizenship. 51 The
court found that First Amendment concerns overrode the
state's interest in preventing problems like citizen protests
and in protecting its own image from harm. 52 The Eighth
Circuit, which a month earlier had allowed the University
46. Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm'r of the Va. Dep't of Motor
Vehicles, 288 F.3d 610, 611, 619-20 (4th Cir. 2002). The Fourth Circuit
distinguished the two cases based on their facts. In Sons of Confederate
Veterans, the state simply wished to generate revenue by selling specialty
license plates, and the Sons of Confederate Veterans had designed the plate and
sought to have it endorsed by the state, so the speech was private. Id. In Rose,
the legislature had authorized and designed the pro-life plates specifically to
promote a particular message, but motorists who chose to purchase the plate
also had clearly endorsed the message, so the speech was mixed governmental
and private. 361 F.3d at 793.
47. 58 F.3d 1075 (5th Cir. 1995).
48. Id. at 1079-81.
49. Id. at 1078-80.
50. Id. at 1080-81.
51. 807 F. Supp 1427, 1435-37 (W.D. Ark. 1992).
52. Id. at 1437-38.
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of Missouri to decline the KKK's sponsorship of a radio
program, 53 found that it was a violation of the First
Amendment to deny its participation in Missouri's adopt-ahighway program. 54 The court concluded that the state's
reason for denying the KKK's participation, its "history of
unlawfully violent and criminal behavior," was a ruse for
55
viewpoint discrimination.
Noting that "[iinconsistent outcomes are often driven by
hard cases," Norton suggests that courts should ask why
private speakers seek to participate in a government
program. 56 For example, why do motorists prefer a specialty
license plate when they could express themselves less
expensively and with much greater flexibility on a bumper
sticker? The answer may be that they "seek the added
emphatic or symbolic value of the government's imprimatur
for their speech ....

In such situations, [the] government's

interest in protecting its speech from being commandeered
by others seems especially strong. ' 57 The government can
promote its own view through its specialty license plate
program, but courts should not compel it 58to provide a
mechanism for promoting the views of others.
This goal might be accomplished effectively without
violating the First Amendment through disclaimers, but it
is not always practical or possible to do so-for example, it
is not clear how the government would issue a disclaimer on
a license plate. 59 Further, there is a problem in these cases
that transcends forum analysis. As Norton observes,
"[b]ecause the government manufactures, erects, owns, and
maintains the signs, the state can be seen as the literal
60
speaker, and thus endorser, of the signs' content."
Requiring the government to print a Confederate flag on a
license plate or to erect a sign recognizing the KKK for
53. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 203 F.3d
1085, 1086 (8th Cir. 2000); see supra notes 42-43.
54. Cuffley v. Mickes, 208 F.3d 702, 703, 711 (8th Cir. 2000).
55. Id. at 705, 709-10.
56. Norton, supra note 38, at 1319-20.
57. Id. at 1338.
58. Id. at 1334-35.
59. Id. at 1339-40.
60. Id. at 1346.
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maintaining a stretch of highway is more than just asking
the government to allow expression of views it does not
endorse; it is requiring it to take active steps to promote
those views. Although it is doubtful that the average
motorist would believe that the government shared the
specific political beliefs of the KKK or the Sons of
Confederate Veterans after seeing a sign by the highway or
the Confederate flag on a specialty license plate, these
state-produced means of speech nonetheless legitimize
those views. Cases involving governmental association with
others' public health messages pose a similar problem.
B. Government as Health Protector
In any discussion of free speech and public health, it is
necessary to define what is meant by public health goals or
values. It is not always obvious what an ideal public health
outcome is, nor is there always a consensus about how to
determine the public health perspective in a particular
situation. Sometimes positive health measures have broad
economic consequences. For example, curing or preventing
a disease has obvious benefits to society, but if it results in
more people living longer lives it may also burden the
health care system by increasing the costs of medical care
for the elderly. In other situations, two public health issues
may conflict with one another, as when someone smokes to
avoid gaining extra weight. In addition, sometimes safety
measures like wearing a seatbelt or helmet can backfire if
drivers engage in riskier behavior because they feel safer
taking these precautions. While acknowledging such
limitations, this discussion will assume that essential
public health goals include avoiding misinformation,
providing the full amount of information that is
scientifically known, discouraging behaviors known to be
risky or harmful, and protecting children from harm caused
by themselves or others.
1. Conflicting Messages: Christ's Bride and Ridley. In
Christ's Bride Ministries, Inc. v. Southeastern Pennsylvania
Transportation Authority, the Third Circuit addressed a
governmental attempt not to send certain health
messages. 61 Christ's Bride Ministries ("CBM"), a religious
61. 148 F.3d 242 (3d Cir. 1998).
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organization, 62 sought to place advertisements in train and
subway stations, on buses, and in bus stops run by the
Southeastern
Pennsylvania Transportation Authority
("SEPTA") in the Philadelphia area. 63 The advertisements
stated: "Women Who Choose Abortion Suffer More &
Deadlier Breast Cancer" and included an 800 number. 64
SEPTA requested that CBM identify itself as the sponsor
on the advertisements, and after CBM agreed, SEPTA
accepted the advertisements, displaying them in subway
and railroad stations beginning in January 1996.65 As soon
as the campaign began, SEPTA received numerous
complaints from riders, women's health groups, and
Philadelphia-area government officials. 66 SEPTA then
requested that CBM add a more prominent identification,
and CBM complied by using larger, bolder font. 67
The contract between CBM and TDI, the company with
which SEPTA contracted to construct and sell advertising
space, included a provision that the contract could be
terminated without notice if SEPTA deemed the advertising
"objectionable for any reason."68 In February 1996, SEPTA
obtained a copy of a letter from the Assistant Secretary of
Health of the United States Department of Health and
Human
Services
("DHHS")
stating
that
CBM's
advertisements were "misleading, unduly alarming, and
[did] not accurately reflect the weight of scientific
literature. ' 69 The Secretary was concerned that callers to
the 800 number were being referred to an article in the
Journal of the National Cancer Institute that suggested a
connection between abortions and breast cancer even
though the same journal had stated in an editorial that the

62. CBM describes itself as "dedicated to the Master's use, to communicate
vital, life-saving truth, correct ruinous error, expose deadly lies, and direct
people to eternal life, while precious, fleeting, temporal time remains." Christ's
Bride Ministries' Mission Statement, http://www.christsbride-min.coml (last
visited Dec. 10, 2008).
63. Christ'sBride, 148 F.3d at 244-45.
64. Id. at 245.

65. Id.
66. Id.

67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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results of this study were not conclusive. 70 In response to
the letter, SEPTA removed the advertisements in February
1996, due to concerns about their inaccuracy. 71 A month
later, TDI informed CBM of the decision and refunded a
pro-rated amount of CBM's money. 72 CBM sued TDI and
SEPTA in May 1996, claiming, inter alia, that they had
violated its First Amendment rights. 73 At trial, experts gave
differing opinions about the relationship between abortion
and breast cancer, but the trial court did not rule on this
issue. 74 Rather, it found that SEPTA's advertising space
was not a public forum and that the letter provided
a
"reasonable" ground to remove the advertisements. 75
On appeal, the Third Circuit overturned the district
court. 76 The court held that SEPTA's advertising space was
a designated public forum because SEPTA had accepted a
wide range of advertisements on many controversial topics
in the past, its written policies excluded only a narrow
range of advertisements, and it had a practice of providing
"virtually unlimited" access to advertising. 77 SEPTA's
actions would have to pass strict scrutiny, but SEPTA had
not argued that it could meet this standard. 78 Without
further discussion, the court concluded that the removal of
the advertisements violated CBM's First Amendment
rights. 79
The court went on to say that even if the
advertisements were outside the scope of the public forum,
SEPTA's actions were not reasonable because the subject
and manner of these advertisements were compatible with
70. Id.
71. Id. at 246.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 246-47.
75. Id. at 246.
76. Id. at 257.
77. Id. at 251-52. The Third Circuit found that, although callers to the 800
number might receive information about medical malpractice attorneys, the
advertisement was not commercial speech because CBM had only a very
attenuated financial motive. Id. at 247.
78. Id. at 255.
79. Id.
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the purposes of the forum. 8 0 A prohibition of "debated and
dubious ads" might be reasonable, but SEPTA had no such
policy.8 In addition, when a SEPTA employee was asked at
trial if he would run an advertisement saying "women who
choose abortion live longer and have less breast cancer," he
said that he would approve this advertisement only if there
were "credible evidence to support it."82 The court pointed
out that this was not the standard used to evaluate CBM's
advertisement because a debatable advertisement may be
supported by some credible
evidence.8 3 It noted
disapprovingly that SEPTA had not given CBM a chance to
provide evidence, explain itself, or clarify its position.8 4
Similarly,
in
Ridley
v.
Massachusetts Bay
Transportation Authority, the First Circuit considered the
Boston-area public transit system's refusal of health-related
advertisements.8 5 Change the Climate, a non-profit
organization advocating the legalization of marijuana,
sought to place several advertisements on buses and in
subway stations.8 6 The Massachusetts Bay Transportation
Authority ("MBTA") rejected the advertisements on the
grounds that they promoted the use of marijuana and
violated MBTA's drug and alcohol policy, although it had no
advertising policy specifically addressing drugs.8 7 The
MBTA did have guidelines prohibiting advertisements
promoting the use of illegal goods or unlawful conduct.88 It
claimed that Change the Climate's advertisements
encouraged illegal use of marijuana by minors and
particularly objected to an advertisement showing a
teenager wearing a backwards baseball cap with the
caption: "Smoking pot is not cool, but we're not stupid, ya

80. Id. at 255-56.
81. Id. at 256-57.
82. Id. at 257.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. 390 F.3d 65 (1st Cir. 2004).
86. Id. at 72-73.
87. Id. at 73.
88. Id.
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know. Marijuana is NOT cocaine or heroin. Tell us the
89
*8...
truth .
The court found that MBTA's advertising space was a
non-public forum because it had consistently rejected
advertisements that were not in compliance with its
advertising guidelines, 90 so it analyzed whether the
was
advertisements
marijuana
of the
exclusion
91
discrimination.
viewpoint
constitutionally prohibited
Three witnesses who testified at the trial-two MBTA
employees and the principal of a Boston high school whose
students rode the MBTA to school-stated that the
advertisement with the teenager led young people to view
92
marijuana as relatively harmless and encouraged its use.
about the advertisements
They also expressed concern
93
act.
illegal
an
advocating
The court held that it was constitutional for the MBTA
to reject advertisements that promoted illegal activity, but
"[s]uspicion that viewpoint discrimination is afoot is at its
zenith when the speech restricted is speech critical of the
government." 94 The court also expressed concerns about
restricting information available to adults based on its
suitability for children. 95 It ultimately concluded that
banning Change the Climate's advertisements was
89. Id. at 73, 83.
90. Id. at 77-82. The Ridley court recognized that its forum analysis differed
from that in Christ's Bride. Id. at 80. It distinguished Christ's Bride because in
that case SEPTA, unlike the MBTA, viewed its advertising space as a 'catalyst
for change,"' the advertisement in question had been refused only after it had
already run and caused controversy, and SEPTA did not have guidelines like
those of the MBTA, as SEPTA "'virtually permitt[ed] unlimited access."' Id. at
80-81 (quoting Christ's Bride Ministries, Inc. v. Se. Penn. Transp. Auth., 148
F.3d 242, 249-52 (3d Cir. 1998)). Nonetheless, the different forum
determinations in these two factually similar cases, as well as legal scholars'
general inability to predict which type of forum courts will find a particular
setting to be, reveals the limited utility of forum analysis. Such inconsistencies
only confirm Lawrence Tribe's statement, quoted in Ridley, that "whether or not
a given place is deemed a 'public forum' is ordinarily less significant than the
nature of the speech restriction." Id. at 75-76 (quoting LAWRENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 992 (2d ed. 1988)).

91. Id. at 82.
92. Id. at 82-84.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 85-86.
95. Id. at 86.
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unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination on several
grounds. 96 First, it suspected that the rejection was based
on MBTA's "distaste" for Change the Climate's point of
view. 97 Second, it found that banning the marijuana
advertisements did not actually further the state's goal to
protect children because the advertisements advocated
changing the law rather than drug use, the MBTA ran
many other advertisements discouraging drug use, and the
MBTA had accepted advertisements advocating the use of
alcohol that could have appealed to juveniles. 98 The court
soundly rejected the MBTA's concern that the teenager
advertisement might encourage drug use among teenagers:
"[t]hat one advertisement, which on its face says use of
marijuana is 'not cool,' would actually induce juveniles to
smoke marijuana strikes us as thin to the point of
implausibility."99 Further, the court held that rejection of
Change the Climate's advertisements was not "reasonable
in light of the purpose of the forum" given that the
advertisements were not likely to foster illegal use of
marijuana among minors and there was not a strong
connection between banning the advertisements and
protecting children.100
In cases like these, it seems likely that the public would
understand that the messages were paid advertisements, so
riders would not attribute the speech literally to the
government. Nonetheless, there is a subtle element of
government endorsement loosely analogous to a highway
sign recognizing the KKK's participation in an adopt-ahighway program. If a bus rider sees an advertisement
saying "Acme is the best store in town," the rider would not
likely assume that the government shared or endorsed this
view. In contrast, advertisements saying "women who
choose abortion suffer more and deadlier breast cancer" or
"marijuana is not heroin or cocaine" fall into a different
category because they convey purportedly scientific
information that could potentially have a direct effect on
riders' health decisions. It is not likely that the average
96. Id. at 87-90.
97. Id. at 87-88.
98. Id. at 88.
99. Id. at 89.
100. Id. at 90.

2009]

WORDS TO LIVE BY

SEPTA customer has access to a cancer journal or the
training to evaluate a scientific article. Riders may believe
that the government's agreement to run this advertisement,
even if a third party produced and paid for it, implies some
degree of validity. Most riders likely would know that
transportation companies have advertising policies and
assume that a vetting process occurs before an
advertisement is accepted. Surely the government would
not accept an advertisement it knew or suspected might
mislead riders or pose a danger to public health? This issue
is critically important, but the government defendants do
not seem to have raised it and the courts do not consider it.
In these cases the government is forced to provide a vehicle
for the dissemination of information it considers harmful to
public health.
The sole reference to governmental attribution in these
cases was a brief portion of testimony in Ridley, where the
school principal acknowledged that her students might be
exposed to similar advertisements elsewhere in the city but
drew a distinction between the two situations because "she
considered the MBTA to be an extension of the school
house."'101 It seems unlikely that the court would have
disregarded this issue if the case involved, for example, the
local Department of Public Health rather than the MBTA.
It is true that a transportation authority is not charged
specifically with health responsibilities in the same way as
the Department of Public Health, although in Christ's Bride
SEPTA was responding to the concerns of a federal agency
that did have public health as a central goal. 10 2 Even if a
transportation authority's obligation to safeguard public
health is more attenuated than that of other government
agencies, the court can consider this fact in its analysis.
There are alternate solutions to this problem that do
not involve infringing on First Amendment rights. For
example, either the federal DHHS or SEPTA could run
counter-advertisements next to each of Christ's Bride's
advertisements bearing an explicit government imprimatur
stating that there is no confirmed link between abortion
and breast cancer. The MBTA could run a similar counter101. Id. at 84.
102. Christ's Bride Ministries, Inc. v. Se. Penn. Transp. Auth., 148 F.3d 242,
245-46 (3d Cir. 1998).
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advertising campaign warning teens of the dangers of
marijuana use. This type of solution would validate the
traditional notion that the solution to speech is more
speech.103 However, it requires the expenditure of
government resources, and the Supreme Court has
explicitly disfavored this approach: "[t]hat kind of forced
response is antithetical to the free discussion that the First
Amendment seeks to foster. . . . [T]he choice to speak
includes within it the choice of what not to say." 104 In
addition, placing two opposing messages alongside one
another in this way implies that there is an active
controversy and may lead viewers to believe that scientists
have not reached consensus about the issue, when in fact
one side represents the views of the vast majority.105
A better resolution would be to incorporate the
government's interest in protecting public health into
traditional First Amendment analysis. If the situation
involves a public forum, courts should consider the
government's role in protecting public health when
evaluating whether the government has a compelling
reason for engaging in content-based discrimination.
Likewise, if a non-public forum is involved, public health
concerns can help a court discern whether a speech
restriction is reasonable given the purpose of the forum.
Public health concerns should not always trump First
Amendment values; in some cases it might well be
appropriate to sacrifice public health goals to safeguard
basic human freedoms like expression. Nonetheless, too
many free speech cases do not weigh these interests at all,
focusing instead on less fundamental governmental

103. See supra text accompanying note 35.
104. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co.v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 16 (1986).
105. Daniel Givelber has discussed this problem in the context of tobacco
litigation, where "the jury may see 2 witnesses for the plaintiff who say
cigarettes cause cancer and 2 for the defendant who say 'we don't know that,"'
implying that there is a controversy when in fact the overwhelming majority of
scientists believe that smoking can cause cancer. Daniel Givelber & Lori
Strickler, Junking Good Science: Undoing Daubert v. Merrill [sic] Dow Through
Cross-Examination and Argument, 96 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 33, 36 (2006).
Through this side-by-side juxtaposition of statements, tobacco companies are
"disputing ...the epidemiological equivalent of the proposition that the earth is
round." Id.
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purposes that are 106
more easily overridden by First
Amendment concerns.
In Christ's Bride, the appellate court performs a classic
First Amendment analysis without fully considering the
public health implications of the advertisements or the
government's unique role in protecting and promoting the
public health. 0 7 If alerted by health authorities, SEPTA
presumably would have also removed an advertisement
stating "women who choose abortion live longer and have
less breast cancer," because this statement is even less
supported by scientific evidence than the opposing one at
issue in the case. Christ's Bride is an ideal example of a
case in which public health concerns should have been
prominent in the analysis. 0 8 Based on its court-described
policy of "permitting virtually unlimited access," 109 it is
unlikely that SEPTA was using health arguments as a
pretext to suppress anti-abortion views. Given its history of
accepting advertisements about a variety of controversial
subjects, SEPTA likely would have accepted advertisements
saying "abortion is murder" or "abortion is a woman's

106. Other public health advocates have made similar points in different
contexts. For example, Richard Daynard has argued that courts do not accord
enough weight to the government's interest in protecting the public from
tobacco products, although he suggests that in the wake of September 11, 2001,
courts might be more willing to recognize that "a major reason we need
[government] is to protect the public's health." Richard A. Daynard, Regulating
Tobacco: The Need for a Public Health JudicialDecision-Making Canon, 30 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 281, 288 (2002). Likewise, Wendy Parmet has said in the
context of federalism:
Our courts do not remind us, perhaps because they do not remember,
that federalism does not exist only for itself, that governments are
instituted for purposes, and that among these purposes is the
preservation of the common good, which is reflected in the ancient
maxim salus populi suprema lex est [the welfare of the people is the
supreme law]. If courts understood this, it might not change their
holdings, but it would at least compel them to explain just how their
federalism doctrines advance at least one goal of a federal republic,
public health.
Wendy E. Parmet, After September 11: Rethinking Public Health Federalism,30
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 201, 208 (2002) (footnote omitted).
107. Christ'sBride, 148 F.3d 242.
108. See id.
109. Id. at 252.
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right."110 Rather atypically among defendants in these
types of cases, SEPTA was responding to express
governmental concerns about scientific inaccuracy when it
discontinued the advertisement,"1 so it is not clear why it
did not raise a governmental interest in protecting the
public health as a defense. It is more accurate to view
Christ's Bride not as a case of viewpoint discrimination but
as a case in which the government sought to avoid
2
promoting false health information."
In contrast, Ridley is a clear case of viewpoint
discrimination because the MBTA stated that it would have
run advertisements stating that marijuana use was
dangerous or should remain illegal. 113 From a public health
standpoint, there is no clear consensus about whether
marijuana should be legal. Because marijuana is harmful,
keeping it illegal can make access difficult and send a clear
message that the government does not approve of its use. 114
On the other hand, if a drug is legalized, it can be taxed
and regulated, people might be more willing to seek drug
treatment, and a host of health risks related to black
markets can be minimized. If the only issue in Ridley had
been the legalization of marijuana, considering public
health concerns might not have obviously favored a
particular outcome. 115 The government certainly could
argue that it has adopted one of these two viewpoints as its
own and should be able to promote it, but in this case it
appears that the MBTA defended its position about the
legality issue based on its advertising policies about
promoting illegal conduct rather than any government
interest in protecting health. 1 6 When the health interest is
110. In fact, in the past SEPTA had accepted advertisements advocating
adoption and providing adoption services, an advertisement that said "[K]eep
Abortion Legal and Safe," and an advertisement for a pro-life hotline. Id. at
251-52. It had also accepted many controversial advertisements about sex,
sexuality, and STDs. Id.
111. Id. at 242, 245-46.
112. See id. at 242, 245-46, 257.
113. Ridley v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 390 F.3d 65, 88 (1st Cir. 2004).
114. See infra text accompanying notes 218-35 (discussing the notable
exception of medical marijuana).
115. See Ridley, 390 F.3d 65.
116. See id. at 69.
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not considered, the court's "[s]uspicion that viewpoint
discrimination is afoot is at its zenith when the speech
restricted is speech critical of the government"'117 becomes
much more compelling.
Unlike SEPTA, the MBTA did raise a health-related
government interest regarding the advertisements allegedly
encouraging marijuana use among minors. 118 The court
recognized that the MBTA had an interest in protecting
children but was extremely skeptical that this interest was
the reason the advertisement had been rejected, especially
because the MBTA previously had accepted advertisements
promoting alcohol that could have been appealing to
children. 119 The court seemed to believe that the MBTA's
real reason for rejection was disapproval of the legalization
of marijuana rather than a genuine concern for the health
implications of these advertisements, in which case First
Amendment concerns would be paramount. 120 The question
remains how the court should balance the issues if the
MBTA had credibly asserted an interest in protecting the
public health as the primary reason for rejecting the
advertisements.
2. Statutory Interpretation: Ashcroft. When these
conflicts arise in the context of statutory interpretation,
courts can construe statutes in ways that protect both the
First Amendment and public health concerns whenever
possible. In Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, the Supreme
Court considered a pre-enforcement challenge to the federal
Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 ("CPPA"). 12 1 The
CPPA banned any visual depiction (including virtual
images) of minors engaged in sexually explicit behavior and
any images "advertised, promoted, presented, described, or
distributed in such a manner that conveys the impression"
of being such material. 122 The Court found that the CPPA
was vastly overbroad; it extended beyond the established
117. Id. at 86; see supra note 94.
118. Id. at 82-85.
119. Id. at 87-90.
120. Id.; see infra text accompanying notes 301-06 (discussing further First
Amendment problems in Ridley).
121. 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
122. Id. at 241-42.
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legal definition of obscenity and could encompass films
dealing with teenage sex or childhood sexual abuse and
many popular Hollywood movies. 123 Although the First
Amendment did not protect child pornography, the CPPA
would have also encompassed images that the First
Amendment
did protect. The Court rejected the
government's argument that virtual images might lead to
actual child abuse because "the causal link is contingent
and indirect. '124 The Court said there needed to be a direct
connection between the speech and an imminent illegal act,
not just a tendency to encourage illegal acts. 125 It pointed
out that many products may be used for immoral purposes
but concluded that the legal response should be to ban the
conduct rather than the means. 126 Further, the Court was
concerned about prohibiting adults from seeing images on
the ground that the images were inappropriate for children
and about suppressing lawful speech as a means of
suppressing illegal speech. 127 The Court used many familiar
free speech concerns to preclude enforcement of a law that
was likely overbroad, but it de-emphasized a government
interest that might have withstood a First Amendment
challenge: the protection
of children from physical and
psychological harm. 128
In her dissent, Justice O'Connor attempted to strike the
balance that the majority would not. 129 She endorsed much
of the majority opinion, agreeing that the law was
overbroad and that banning images involving adults who
merely appeared to be children was problematic because it
could
encompass
speech protected by the First

123. Id. at 246-50.
124. Id. at 236.
125. Id. at 236, 253-54.
126. Id. at 251-53.
127. Id. at 236.
128. Id. at 234-73. Public health is only one aspect of the Ashcroft case.
Protecting children from child pornography is no doubt a government interest,
but it is related to law enforcement as well as to health. Nonetheless, child
abuse is widely recognized as a public health problem and, as with other health
issues, both government health agencies and medical professionals are involved
in its prevention and treatment.
129. Id. at 260-67 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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Amendment. 130 However, unlike the majority, O'Connor
would have upheld a ban on virtual images that were
indistinguishable from actual child pornography because
not doing so could impede prosecution of child
pornographers. 131 Further, she recognized congressional
findings that the consequences of such images were similar
to those of actual child pornography, stimulating pedophiles
and allowing them to use the materials to convince children
to participate in sexual activities. 132 Frequently referring to
the congressional record, she explicitly acknowledged that
the government had a compelling interest in protecting
children and that a ban only on images indistinguishable
from actual children would be narrowly tailored enough to
meet First Amendment requirements. 133
Because the statute in Ashcroft was overbroad and
parts of it violated the First Amendment, the Court seemed
unwilling to give weight to the government's interest in
protecting children. 134 Justice O'Connor, on the other hand,
recognized the protection of children as a compelling
interest to balance against First Amendment concerns for a
narrow subset of images covered by the statute. 135 As her
dissent illustrates, Ashcroft did not have to be an all-ornothing case. 136 It is not clear why the majority disregarded
congressional findings about the potential for abuse;
perhaps the serious constitutional deficiencies of some parts
of the statute influenced the Court to adopt a First
Amendment absolutist stance when evaluating the rest. In
any case, like Christ's Bride, Ashcroft is a case in which a
court did not properly weigh the government's interest in

130. Id. at 262-263.
131. Id. at 266-67.
132. Id. at 263-64.
133. Id. at 263-65. In his dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist agreed with
O'Connor but asserted that the entire statute could have been construed in a
way consistent with the First Amendment. Id. at 267-73 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
134. Id. at 234 (majority opinion).
135. Id. at 263-68 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
136. Id.
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IV. SPEECH AS ENVIRONMENT

Professor George Wright challenges the notion that
these types of cases should be conceptualized as a conflict
between free speech on one hand and another value on the
other. 138 He argues that most free speech cases are in fact
conflicts between two competing free speech values: "[o]n a
deeper level, standard free speech values are always the
only values on each side of any free speech case."'1 39 Wright
describes three such values: the pursuit of truth; "a stable,
progressive,
uncorrupt, and responsive
democratic
government;" and self-realization in relation to personal
development and autonomy. 140 The last value is of particular
importance because it is "at the heart of both free speech
14
and of government regulatory interests generally."'
Furthermore, "[b]asic government purposes and free speech
values do not, at some basic level, so much conflict as
correspond."'142 Wright points out that the government does
not protect free speech rights for an abstract 43
theoretical
reason but because they matter in everyday life.'
How should the practical effects of speech influence the
balancing courts must perform in free speech cases? As an
example, Wright discusses Avis Rent A Car System, Inc. v.
Aguilar.144 In this case, the California Supreme Court
considered a situation in which an Avis employee engaged
in racially-motivated harassment of Latino employees, who
sued him under state employment law. 146 The court upheld
a lower court's decision to grant the Latino plaintiffs'
137. See id. at 234 (majority opinion); Christ's Bride Ministries, Inc. v. Se.
Penn. Transp. Auth., 148 F.3d 242 (3d Cir. 1998).
138. R. George Wright, Why Free Speech Cases Are as Hard (and as Easy) as
They Are, 68 TENN. L. REV. 335, 336 (2001).

139. Id.
140. Id. at 337-38.
141. Id. at 341.
142. Id. at 343.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 356-60; 529 U.S. 1138 (2000).
145. Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 980 P.2d 846, 848-49 (Cal. 1999).
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request for injunctive relief and prohibit the harasser from
saying in the workplace a specific list of words (to be
146
written by the trial court) deemed offensive to Latinos.
The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari, but Justice
Thomas dissented from the Court's decision not to consider
the case, expressing his concern about the "troubling First
Amendment issues raised by this injunction." 147 Even if the
First Amendment does allow prohibiting certain speech if
the speech violates a state workplace harassment law,
Thomas argued, the remedy in this case should be financial
damages rather than the constitutionally suspect prior
restraint the injunction imposed.148
Wright suggests that Thomas's viewpoint does not
adequately address the free speech values on the plaintiffs'
side of the case. 149 Wright emphasizes the damage to the
self-realization of the harassed employees and believes that
it should be weighed at least as much as the free speech
interests of the harasser:
[I]t is difficult to put an approximate dollar figure on the negative
value of the infliction of demeaning racial epithets. Even one such
incident may, in subtle but important ways, impair the victim's
quality of social and political life.
To attempt to put a compensatory dollar figure on the possible
forms of inhibition, withdrawal, anger, alienation, distraction, selfcensorship, and other reactions to such ethnic slurs is an exercise
as much in arrogance as in irresponsible speculation. 150

To Wright, the prior restraint approach endorsed by the
California courts is the preferred one in this situation
because it prevents the impediment to the employees' selfrealization from ever occurring. 151 With this observation, he
considers the free speech implications on the "non-free

146. Id. at 848-50.
147. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc. v. Aguilar, 529 U.S. 1138, 1140 (2000)
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 1142-43.
149. Wright, supranote 138, at 357-59.
150. Id. at 357-58.
151. Id. at 356-60.
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speech" side of the case. 152 Wright's approach is similar to a
social constructionist argument that Kathleen Sullivan
describes. 153 The central idea of this argument is that
"speech constructs us and conditions our actions; it makes
us who we are. Culture determines power; it is not the
other way around. Speech and conduct 154are continuous;
ideas construct reality and reflect it back."
This social constructionist view, though originally not
developed in the health context, is particularly useful in
framing public health issues. Public health is sometimes
viewed as the aggregate result of individual choices. Under
this model, the primary role of the government is to educate
citizens about health-related issues so they will make
informed personal decisions. The government only plays a
more active role when, for example, an outbreak of
contagious disease requires widespread coordination and
planning. This view ignores the reality of the environments
in which people actually make health decisions. For this
reason, many advocates have called for a more populationbased approach to public health. 155 A population-wide
model recognizes that people do not make choices in a
vacuum. Financial limitations, social constraints, and
addiction may inhibit one's ability to act on health
knowledge, and even those who face fewer direct obstacles
may find it excessively difficult or inconvenient to resist
unhealthy cultural norms. The physical, social, cultural,
and political environment in which people live has a
tremendous influence on health outcomes, and the health
behaviors favored by this environment will become the
"choice" of most people, so a key goal of law should be not to
attempt to change individual health decisions, but to alter
the environment in which such decisions are made.
Applying Wright's analysis in this context, public
156
health can be imagined as a kind of self-realization.
Health is, in an essential way, the foundation of autonomy.
152. Id. at 357-60.
153. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Free Speech Wars, 48 SMU L. REV. 203 (1994).
154. Id. at 210.
155. See, e.g., Jess Alderman et al., Application of Law to the Childhood
Obesity Epidemic, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 90 (2007); Parmet & Smith, supra note
32.
156. See Wright, supra note 138.
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The ability to make informed decisions about matters that
directly impact one's well-being as well as to preserve the
capacity to make such decisions in the future is one of the
most basic human dignities. To the extent that certain
speech makes the environment less favorable to health, this
speech impedes self-realization, and courts might consider
this effect when balancing competing interests.
Although there is no doubt that speech can and does
affect health in this way, this argument has serious
implications that might not be apparent in Aguilar.157 If
courts began to attach heavy weight to self-realization, they
would likely decide cases in favor of the government, the
usual defendant in free speech cases and the party that can
most credibly assert protection of public health as a
countervailing interest. The result would be largely
unrestricted government power to regulate speech on public
health grounds. As previously discussed, there are many
reasons this power would be a positive development for
public heath. However, such power also raises significant
concerns. As Sullivan warns, "there might be special
dangers in trusting government to change culture ... [It is]
a non sequitur . . . [to] move from the premise that we are
socially constructed to the conclusion that we should give
the state a monopoly on our reconstruction. Epistemology
does not entail polity."158 Though there are advantages to
the government's primary role in the health speech market,
it is also a situation fraught with the potential for abuse.
V. PROBLEMS WITH GOVERNMENT POWER OVER SPEECH

The government wields a tremendous amount of power
in a speech situation. Streets, sidewalks, and parks are the
only settings in which the government must allow
speech. 159 In other kinds of fora, the government may
determine which kinds of speech to permit and may control
the parameters of the forum. 160 It is only when the
government has chosen to allow speech that it becomes

157. See Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 980 P.2d 846 (Cal. 1999).
158. Sullivan, supra note 153, at 214.
159. Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
160. Kaplan v. County of Los Angeles, 894 F.2d 1076, 1080 (9th Cir. 1990).
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subject to constitutional restraints. 161 In addition, Randall
P. Bezanson and William G. Buss point out that the
government is the only speaker with the ability to regulate
other speakers. 162 Although a government must speak and
can enhance the marketplace of ideas, it is not possible to
separate completely government speech and government
regulation. 163 As Sullivan observes, "[t]he government alone
has a monopoly of force. If Simon and Schuster rejects you,
you can go to Random House. If the government
bans your
'64
novel, you may have to move to France.'
Further, the government is not subject to the same
market forces that influence other speakers:
[I]ts speech can persist, even dominate, a forum in the face of
indifference or disagreement. It can even . . . monopolize a created
forum with the government's message. Government can do this
because its right to speak effectively reverses the rule of the
market, placing on individual citizens the burden of regulating the
government's speech activity only through resort to full-scale
democratic processes ....In this sense the government as speaker
cannot claim that it is just a "participant" in the market.
165
Government participation necessarily alters the market.

Government speech is a distinct entity shielded from
the natural restraints that limit other speech. Even in a
democracy, government speech realistically cannot be
characterized as a reflection of the ideas of individual
citizens or a collective individual expression. 166 The risks of
government speech derive not from the intentions behind it
but from the mechanisms it uses to produce and distribute
it.167 When the government influences the distribution of
speech, there is a significant risk of distortion-an altering
of the speech environment to favor the government's own
message- 6 8 -and deception.

161. Id.
162. Bezanson & Buss, supra note 36, at 1501.

163. Id.
164. Sullivan, supra note 153, at 207.
165. Bezanson & Buss, supra note 36, at 1507-08.
166. Id. at 1504-05.
167. Id. at 1384.
168. Id. at 1491.
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A. Distortion
1. Distorted messages: Rust and Casey. In Rust v.
Sullivan, the Supreme Court heard a facial challenge to the
federal Department of Health and Human Services
("DHHS") regulations that prohibited projects receiving
funding under Title X of the Public Health Service Act from
discussing abortion in the form of counseling, referral, or
advocacy. 169 Title X authorized the Secretary 'to assist in
the establishment and operation of voluntary family
planning projects which shall offer a broad range of
acceptable and effective family planning methods and
services"' but also prohibited the use of funds .'in programs
where abortion is a method of family planning.' 170 Eighteen
years after Congress passed Title X, the Secretary issued
new regulations to clarify that it was meant to cover
"preconceptional" services only; the result was the exclusion
of abortion, prenatal care, and childbirth. 171 Grantees were
required to refer patients for prenatal care but forbidden to
refer them for abortion even if a patient directly asked for a
referral to an abortion provider.1 72 The regulations also
prohibited pro-choice lobbying, disseminating materials
advocating abortion, providing pro-choice speakers, and
paying dues to groups that primarily advocate abortion. 173
They required separate facilities, staff, and record-keeping
between Title X-funded projects and other services. 174
The Court found that the statutory language was
ambiguous because it did not directly address counseling,
referral, or advocacy, but it held that the Secretary's
construction was acceptable and within his statutory
authority.175 The Court found no First Amendment
violation because the government

169. 500 U.S. 173, 177-80 (1991).

170. Id. at 178 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§300(a)-300a-6).
171. Id. at 179-80.
172. Id. at 180.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 187.
175. Id. at 173-74.
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can, without violating the Constitution, selectively fund a program
to encourage certain activities it believes to be in the public
interest, without at the same time funding an alternative program
which seeks to deal with the problem in another way. In so doing,
the Government has not discriminated on the basis of viewpoint; it
has merely chosen to fund one activity to the exclusion of the
other. 176

The government was not "suppressing a dangerous idea"
but simply making sure project funds were spent
in
correctly. 177 Further, Title X grantees were free to engage 178
abortion-related speech outside the scope of the project.
The Court also rejected the plaintiffs' claim that there was
no exception for a medical emergency; it held that an
emergency abortion would not be considered family
planning, so the statute 179
did not prohibit an abortion
referral in such a situation.
In addition, the plaintiffs claimed that the government
was denying a benefit on a basis that infringed on a
constitutional right. 80 The Court found that the
government was not giving a benefit to anyone and not
requiring anyone to give up free speech rights outside of the
program's context.' 8 ' Finally, the Court recognized that the
doctor-patient relationship might enjoy significant First
Amendment protection even when the government funded
the care. 8 2 It did not address that issue because it found
that Title X did not require doctors to present opinions not
their own and that in this context, the relationship was not
"sufficiently all encompassing so as to justify an expectation
on the 8 part
of the patient of comprehensive medical
3
advice.'

176. Id. at 193.
177. Id. at 194.
178. Id. at 183.
179. Id. at 195.
180. Id. at 195-96.
181. Id. at 196.
182. Id. at 200.
183. Id. The Court also held that the regulations did not violate the patients'
due process rights under the Fifth Amendment because the government was
under no obligation to fund abortion referrals or services and patients could
receive information about abortion outside the context of Title X. Id. at 201-03.
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In his dissent, Justice Blackmun protested that the
Court had never before upheld viewpoint discrimination
imposed on those dependent on government funding.' 8 4 He
also objected to the Court permitting limitations on patientdoctor dialogue "when that regulation has both the purpose
and the effect of manipulating [the patient's] decision." 185
He added that the government could not condition receipt of
government funds on the surrender of speech rights when
the limitation was based on the substance of that speech. 186
He also disagreed with the Court that Title X did not force
doctors to become instruments of a message they might not
endorse: "Under the majority's reasoning, the First
Amendment could be read to tolerate any governmental
restriction upon an employee's speech so long as that
restriction is limited to the funded workplace. This is a
dangerous proposition ....
,,l87 Title X prevented doctors
from telling patients about "the full range of information
and options regarding their health and reproductive
freedom.' 88 The restrictions also were not narrowly
tailored because misuse of Title X funds could be prevented
through stringent bookkeeping. 8 9 "Finally, it is of no small
significance that the speech the Secretary would suppress is
truthful information regarding constitutionally protected
conduct of vital importance to the listener. One can imagine
no legitimate governmental interest that might be served
by suppressing such information."'190
In PlannedParenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey, the Court considered numerous constitutional
challenges to Pennsylvania's amended abortion statute.' 91
This discussion will address only the informed consent
provision, which required health practitioners to provide
women with certain information at least twenty-four hours

184. Id. at 207 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 204.

186. Id. at 207.
187. Id. at 213.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 214.
190. Id. at 215.
191. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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before the abortion. 192 This information included the nature
of the procedure, the risks of both childbirth and abortion,
the estimated gestational age of the fetus, a list of agencies
providing abortion alternative services, and the availability
of child support from the father. 193 Practitioners also had to
offer the patient state-produced materials about the fetus
and medical assistance for childbirth, and the patient had
to give written confirmation that she was offered these
materials and that they were available if she had asked to
194
see them.
The Court overruled portions of its holdings in prior
abortion cases and found it constitutional for the government
to require "the giving of truthful, nonmisleading information"
such as that required in Pennsylvania. 195 The Court stressed
that this type of information was reasonably connected to
making sure the woman was fully informed. 96 The Court
also found that the state could require that information
about the fetus be given even though it was not directly
related to the patient's health, and it noted that doctors
were exempt from these requirements if they could show
(by a preponderance of the evidence) that they held a
reasonable belief that doing so would have a "severely
adverse effect" on the patient. 197 The Court dismissed the
concerns with little discussion,
First Amendment
concluding that these requirements were no different than
informed consent requirements for other procedures. 198 To
the extent that the requirements implicated doctors' speech
rights, they did so only as part of regulating the practice of
medicine, an area long subject to state control. 199
Dissenting from this part of the opinion, Justice
Stevens argued that the materials were clearly meant to
manipulate the patient's decision and that it was
constitutionally problematic to require that the information
192. Id. at 881.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 882.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 883-84.
198. Id. at 884.
199. Id.
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be given to all patients when it was not necessarily useful
to everyone; he believed the gestational age of the fetus was
particularly irrelevant in most patients' decision making. 200
He agreed with the majority that informing the woman of
the risks of abortion and childbirth was neutral medical
information that was constitutional to require. 201 Justice
Blackmun also believed that the information was designed
to influence the woman's decision and did not allow the
physician to exercise professional discretion. 20 2 'Forcing the
physician or counselor to present the materials and the list
to the woman makes him or her in effect an agent of the
State in treating the woman and places his or her
imprimatur upon both the materials and the list."'2 0 3
Further, requiring the provision of certain information '"is
the antithesis of informed consent."' 20 4
Chief Justice Rehnquist, arguing to uphold the entire
informed consent provision, emphasized that there had
been no assertion that the information was untrue and
found that the requirements were rationally related to a
legitimate government interest. 205 He added:
That the information might create some uncertainty and persuade
some women to forgo abortions does not lead to the conclusion that
the Constitution forbids the provision of such information. Indeed,
it only demonstrates that this information might very well make a
difference, and that it is therefore relevant to a woman's informed
20 6
choice.

Many scholars have written about the free speech
implications of Rust and Casey,20 7 although typically in the
200. Id. at 921-22 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
201. Id. at 917-18.

202. Id. at 933-36 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
203. Id. at 935 (quoting Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 762-63 (1986)).

204. Id. at 936 (quoting Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 764).
205. Id. at 967-68 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

206. Id. at 968-69.
207. See, e.g., Paula E. Berg, Lost in a Doctrinal Wasteland: The
Exceptionalism of Doctor-Patient Speech within the Rehnquist Court's First
Amendment Jurisprudence, 8 HEALTH MATRIX 153 (1998); Christina E. Wells,

Abortion Counseling as Vice Activity: The Free Speech Implications of Rust v.
Sullivan and Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1724 (1995).
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context of abortion rights rather than from a purely public
health perspective. In many ways, it is regrettable that
abortion sets legal precedent for so many other public
health issues because it is a highly politicized and
emotional issue involving rather unique ethical and legal
circumstances. In many public health debates, experts
eventually reach agreement about how to identify the key
public health question: for example, does cigarette smoking
cause cancer and other health problems? Disagreement
centers on issues such as the extent to which government
should attempt to influence individual behavior, the
significance of a particular health risk when compared to
others, the economic and social costs of public health
programs, and similar questions. In contrast, there is no
consensus about how to frame abortion as a public health
issue: one side focuses on eliminating the high levels of
maternal morbidity and mortality that occurred when
abortion was illegal, while the other side measures injury
and death to the fetus. In addition, although many public
health issues raise ethical concerns, few so starkly place
one party's life against another's autonomy. For these
reasons, abortion has become a highly charged political
issue.
Courts tend to conceptualize abortion as a conflict 208
of
individual rights rather than as a public health issue.
Because abortion cases often set precedent for laws governing
doctor-patient, interactions, government involvement in
individuals' health decisions, and regulation of the practice
of medicine, they have a tremendous but often unnoticed
impact on other public health issues. Abortion has stymied
public health law in the sense that no discussion of public
health law is possible without first wading through the
emotional and legal conundrum of abortion cases. This is
unfortunate because abortion precedents can undermine
public health goals if courts apply them to situations
involving other public health issues. The abortion
controversy is likely the reason that Justices on both sides
of abortion cases seem to avoid acknowledging some of the
larger public health implications of their opinions.
The majority opinions in Rust and Casey ignore a
central problem with government-mandated health speech.

208. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. 833; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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They are correct that the government may choose and
sponsor its own message; the government may choose to
disfavor abortion if it determines that such a message is in
the public interest. However, this conclusion does not
resolve the issue here, as both cases seem to imply. The
majorities do not consider the distortion that results in
these cases. In Rust, the patient population consists
primarily of women who likely cannot afford to seek
medical care elsewhere. 20 9 Although it is true that the
Constitution does not require the government to fund
abortions for indigent women, particularly when it has
determined that abortion is against public policy, it is
another matter entirely for the government to block their
access to private messages about legal medical options. The
Court's claim that the doctor-patient relationship here is
not "sufficiently all encompassing so as to justify an
expectation on the part of the patient of comprehensive
medical advice 210 is questionable. The patient population
dependent on Title X funds is not likely to have the
knowledge or resources to seek further information
elsewhere, and in fact it might be questionable whether
Title X patients would regularly see another doctor at all,
even for care unrelated to reproductive issues. The Rust
majority's disregard for this fact is problematic.
Likewise, in Casey, the Court ignores speech market
distortion. The constitutional problem in this case arises
not only from the information required, but also from the
unanswered
questions about what information is
suppressed-is a doctor free to tell patients that she
disagrees with the state's information and to present
alternative information? Considering this question would at
least begin to address Justice Blackmun's concerns about
forcing doctors to become agents of the state and place their
imprimatur on state speech. The Court could then analyze
whether the doctor's counter-speech would be sufficient to
remedy the constitutional problem. 21 ' Although this
question would seem to be a key issue in Casey, the
majority simply treats the information requirement as

209. See Bezanson & Buss, supra note 36, at 1397-98.
210. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 200 (1991); see also id.; supra note 183.
211. Probably not. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
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and disregards its First
regulation of medical practice
212
Amendment ramifications.
The dissenting opinions in these two cases also seem
not to consider some of the wider public health implications
of their opinions. The dissenters object that the state
information is clearly meant to manipulate women's
decisions, a fact that is offensive to them in the abortion
context. 213 Yet manipulation of public opinion is, in fact, a
central feature of most governmental speech related to
public health. 214 Anti-drug campaigns seek to persuade
citizens that drug use is dangerous; vaccination
requirements send a message that the risks of vaccines are
preferable to the risk of contracting measles, mumps, or
rubella; the Surgeon General's report warns citizens that,
contrary to what some have believed in the past, secondhand smoke poses serious health risks. As Chief Justice
Rehnquist observed, "this information might very well
make a difference. ' 21 5 Would the dissenters in Rust or Casey
consider it unconstitutional if doctors were required to
provide patients with information about any of these
governmental messages? The answer is uncertain. Such
requirements would still raise free speech issues, but the
analysis should not differ simply because the subject is
abortion.
2. Recognizing Distortion: Conant and Rounds I. Some
federal appellate courts have done a better job of
recognizing potential distortion. In Rose, when the Fourth
Circuit ruled that offering a pro-life but not a pro-choice
plate was unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination, it
noted that "[b]y granting access to the license plate forum
only to those who share its viewpoint, South Carolina has
provided pro-life supporters with an instrument for
expressing their position and has distorted the specialty

212. Casey, 505 U.S. at 884.
213. Casey, 505 U.S. at 916 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part), 926 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Rust, 500
U.S. at 204 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
214. See infra text accompanying notes 293-94.
215. Casey, 505 U.S. at 968-69 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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license plate forum in favor of one message. 2 16 This
distortion was of special concern because "the State's
advocacy of the pro-life viewpoint may not be readily
apparent to those who see the Choose Life plate, and this
electoral
from
advocacy
the
State's
insulates
accountability. ' 217 Courts have recognized this problem in
other cases as well.
In Conant v. Walters, the Ninth Circuit reviewed a
permanent injunction against the federal government
granted on First Amendment grounds. 2 18 In 1996,
California voters approved an initiative legalizing the use of
marijuana for specific medical purposes. 219 The law granted
physicians immunity from state prosecution for recommending
or approving the use of medical marijuana. 220 Federal
marijuana policy promulgated in response to the California
law held that recommending or prescribing marijuana to
patients was "not consistent with the 'public interest"' and
would result in a loss of the doctor's license to prescribe
controlled substances. 221 The federal government sent a
letter to various medical associations warning their
members about this policy. 222 A federal court granted the
plaintiff doctors' and patients' request for an injunction
against investigating a doctor or revoking a doctor's license
223
based solely on a recommendation of medical marijuana.
The government argued that a doctor's recommendation
of medical marijuana would lead to illegal drug use; a
216. Planned Parenthood of S.C., Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 795 (4th Cir.
2004).
217. Id. "The array of choices makes the license plate forum appear
increasingly like a forum for private speech. As the citizen becomes less likely to
associate specialty plate messages with the State, the State's accountability for
any message is correspondingly diminished." Id. at 799.
218. 309 F.3d 629, 630 (9th Cir. 2002).
219. Id. at 632.
220. Id.
221. Id. (referring to the term "public interest" as defined in 21 U.S.C.A. §
823).
222. Id. at 633.
223. The federal government was permitted to revoke a doctor's license for
prescribing or dispensing marijuana. Id. The Supreme Court later held that the
federal government could prosecute the users and growers of medical marijuana
even though their conduct was legal in California. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1
(2005).
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medical recommendation was likely to imply that the use of
medical marijuana was acceptable. 224 The court pointed out
that recommending medical marijuana did not satisfy the
legal elements needed to establish either aiding and
abetting or conspiracy.225 Doctors could not be held
responsible for patient behavior simply because they could
anticipate patients might engage in it at a later time. 226 The
court recognized Ashcroft's holding that speech cannot be
banned to prevent potential illegal conduct. 227 In addition,
illegal conduct was not the only patient action doctors
might anticipate. If patients understood that they could not
access a drug recommended by their doctors, their response
might be to lobby for changes in the laws, which is at the
heart of First Amendment protection. 228 As the district
court reasoned, "the prohibition compromises a patient's
meaningful participation in public discourse. '229
Further, the court recognized that honest and open
communication between doctors and patients was "[a]n
integral component of the practice of medicine. ' 230 In sharp
contrast to the Supreme Court's stance in many abortion
cases, the Ninth Circuit found that "[b]eing a member of a
regulated profession does not . . . result in a surrender of
First Amendment rights" and that professional speech
should be afforded strong First Amendment protection. 231
Prohibiting the expression of the idea that marijuana could
help a specific patient was viewpoint discrimination. 232
Significantly, the court rejected the government's argument
that Rust and Casey were controlling, finding that the
federal marijuana policy, unlike the abortion information
requirements, interfered with doctors' exercise of their
professional judgment. 233 Also, in this case the situation
224. Conant, 309 F.3d at 634-35, 638.
225. Id. at 635-36.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 638.
228. Id. at 634, 636-37.
229. Id. at 634.
230. Id. at 636.
231. Id. at 637.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 638.
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was too subjective: after a conversation with their doctors
about the risks and benefits of medical marijuana, some
patients might believe marijuana had been "recommended"
and others might not. 234 It was a First Amendment
violation to forbid speech based on such a subjective,
individualistic standard. 235
A panel of Eighth Circuit judges decided the abortion
information case Planned Parenthoodv. Rounds in October
2006 ("Rounds f").236 Consistent with Casey, the Eighth
Circuit had already upheld a South Dakota law requiring
information very similar to that required in Pennsylvania,
and, as in Casey, it did not address such requirements'
potential distortion of the speech market. 237 In 2005, South
Dakota expanded its information requirements to mandate
that two hours before an abortion the doctor must give the
patient written information stating that "the abortion will
terminate the life of a whole, separate, unique, living
human being," that she has a legally protected relationship
with this human being, and that this relationship and
associated legal rights will end with the abortion. 238 In
addition, the written statement had to provide information
about the psychiatric risks of abortion (depression and
suicide) and the patient had to sign each page of the written
disclosures. 239 Also, twenty-four hours before the procedure
the patient had to be provided with contact information for
a nearby crisis pregnancy center. 240 Planned Parenthood
sought a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the
2 41
law.

234. Id. at 639.
235. Id. The court also found that professional regulation was traditionally
the province of the states and that, as a federal court, it should minimize
conflict between federal and state law to the extent possible. Id.
236. See generally Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 467
F.3d 716 (8th Cir. 2006), vacated, 530 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 2008).
237. Planned Parenthood, Sioux Falls Clinic v. Miller, 63 F.3d 1452, 1467
(8th Cir. 1995).
238. Rounds I, 467 F.3d at 719-20.
239. Id. at 720.
240. Id.
241. Id.
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In an unusual turn, the court evaluated the scientific
validity of the information. 242 The court interpreted Casey
as holding that the required information must be
scientifically and medically accurate. 243 The Eighth Circuit
found that the record supported the district court's
conclusion that "the challenged disclosures express a value
judgment rather than medical facts. '244 Also, the state had
not shown that these requirements were the least
burdensome way of furthering its interest in protecting
fetal life and maternal health. 245 Significantly, in this case
South Dakota argued that the court could construe the law
to allow physicians to dissociate themselves from the state's
message, but the court disagreed that the law could
reasonably be read this way. 246 The court found that even if
the statute did allow doctors to disavow the state's message,
constitutional problems would arise if the generally neutral
and truthful information would be misleading when applied
to a specific patient. Also, if the message "primarily conveys
a subjective political, ideological, or moral viewpoint rather
than medical facts . . . the injury [to the doctor] which
results .. .would not be eliminated by simply allowing her
' 247
to add her own views.
The court noted that Casey contained an exception if
the doctor believed that providing information could result
in a "severely adverse effect" on the woman, while South
Dakota's only exception was when informed consent was
impossible to obtain. 248 The court concluded that this
portion of South Dakota's law unduly interfered with
doctors' medical judgment. 249 Rather than promote
informed decision making, the required information here
"may actually exacerbate any adverse . . .consequences of
the procedure. ' 250

242. Id. at 723-24.
243. Id. at 722-23.
244. Id. at 723.
245. Id. at 724-25.
246. Id. at 725-26.
247. Id. at 725.
248. Id. at 726.
249. Id. at 725-26.
250. Id. at 727.
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These two cases recognize the potential for government
policies to cause distortion in the marketplace of ideas. In
Conant, the court sees that not allowing a doctor to tell a
patient about all treatment options has not only medical
but also political consequences. 251 Further, the court affords
strong First Amendment protection to professional speech
to reduce governmental interference with professional
medical judgment. 252 Rounds I is one of the few cases to
evaluate the truthfulness of mandated governmental
speech, suggesting that "value judgments" create more
constitutional problems than scientific facts. 253 Like
Conant, it places a high value on professional judgment and
seeks to minimize state interference in the doctor-patient
relationship. 254 In addition, it considers whether counterspeech is a practical solution to the distortion problem,
concluding that when the required speech is something
other than objective facts it causes injury to the doctor to be
forced to provide the 255
information, even if she is then able to
add her own opinion.
Sitting en banc, the Eighth Circuit later reversed
Rounds J.256 In Rounds II, the court required a higher
standard for determining the moving party's chance of
success on the merits to grant a preliminary injunction
against enforcement of a statute. 257 The court recognized
that affidavits in the case presented conflicting testimony
concerning
whether the required language
about
"terminat[ing] the life of a whole, separate, unique, living
human being" could be classified as scientific rather than
"'statements of ideology and opinion."' 258 However, the court
251. Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 634, 636-37 (9th Cir. 2002); see supra
notes 230-31.
252. Id. at 636-38.
253. Rounds I, 467 F.3d at 722-23; see supra notes 242-47.
254. Id. at 725-26.
255. Id. at 725.
256. Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724 (8th Cir.
2008).
257. Id. at 731-32.
258. Id. at 726-28 (quoting S.D.C.L. § 34-23A-10.1; Ball Aff.
2.). In its
analysis of the truthfulness of the state messages, the court focused on the
"terminate the life of a whole, separate, unique, living human being" language
and did not directly address the required warnings about psychological distress,
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considered the statutory definition of "human being," which
explicitly included embryos and fetuses, and concluded that
when the required language was considered in light of this
definition, "the truthfulness and relevance of the disclosure

including depression and suicide. In the midst of its discussion of the former, it
approvingly quoted Gonzales v. Carhart:"Whether to have an abortion requires
a difficult and painful moral decision. While we find no reliable data to measure
the phenomenon, it seems unexceptionable to conclude some women come to
regret their choice to abort .

. .

. Severe depression and loss of esteem can

follow." Id. at 734 (quoting Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007)).
The Eighth Circuit failed to recognize that the Supreme Court's admission
in Gonzales suggests that at least some of the South Dakota law's required
language was based on conjecture rather than scientific data. While it is likely
true that some women regret having an abortion or suffer psychological
consequences from terminating a pregnancy, some measure of the percentage of
patients so affected would be highly relevant to a First Amendment analysis of
whether a warning about serious psychological consequences of the procedure
(unaccompanied by information about the likelihood of occurrence) is truthful
and non-misleading. As currently worded, the South Dakota law seems to imply
that severe psychological consequences are common.
There is evidence that most women do not suffer long-term psychological
damage from having an abortion. See, e.g., Anne C. Gilchrist et al.,
Termination of Pregnancy and Psychiatric Morbidity, 167 BRITISH J.
PSYCHIATRY 243 (1995) ("Rates of total reported psychiatric disorder were no
higher after termination of pregnancy than after childbirth."); Brenda Major et

al., Psychological Responses of Women After First-Trimester Abortion, 57
ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 777, 780-81 (2000) (finding that in a study of

abortion patients two years after the procedure, most women did not suffer
psychological consequences; the minority who did tended to have a prior
history of depression). Other studies have shown a correlation between
abortion and poor mental health. See, e.g., David M. Fergusson et al., Abortion

and Mental Health Disorders: Evidence from a 30-year Longitudinal Study,
193 BRITISH J. PSYCHIATRY 444, 444 (2008) ("[A]bortion may be associated with
a small increase in risk of mental disorders."); Kaeleen Dingle et al., Pregnancy

Loss and PsychiatricDisorders in Young Women: An Australian Birth Cohort
Study, 193 BRITISH J. PSYCHIATRY 455 (2008) (concluding that pregnancy lossboth abortion and miscarriage-increased substance abuse and affective
disorders in young Australian women). As at least one author has pointed out,
it is extremely difficult to design a study of post-abortion psychological
problems that will produce accurate results because of multiple confounding
variables. Brenda Major, Psychological Implications of Abortion -- Highly
Charged and Rife with Misleading Research, 168 CAN. MED. ASSOC. J. 1257
(2003). Cf. Nancy F. Russo & Jean E. Denious, Violence in the Lives of Women

Having Abortions: Implications for Practice and Public Policy, 32 PROF.
PSYCHOL. 142 (2001) (finding that abortion was not related to mental health
problems when researchers controlled for variables like history of abuse and
partner characteristics; mental health problems may be incorrectly attributed
to abortion rather than to underlying violence in abortion patients' lives).
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generates little dispute." 259 Therefore, it concluded that
South Dakota law did not compel doctors to speak in an
unconstitutional way because the information required was
truthful, non-misleading, and relevant to the woman's
decision whether to terminate her pregnancy. 260 The court
also held that because the required language was
sufficiently objective, there was no need to analyze whether
doctors had the ability to dissociate themselves from the
message 261
or whether this could present a constitutional
problem.
The dissent echoed points made by the majority in
Rounds I. Arguing that the South Dakota requirements far
surpassed those upheld in earlier decisions like Casey, the
dissenting opinion concluded that "the Act expresses
ideological beliefs aimed at making it more difficult for
women to choose abortions .... [T]he Act force[s] physicians
to advise their patients on metaphysical matters about
which there is no medical consensus. ' 262 In the context of
abortion, even the definition of the phrase "human being"
becomes morally charged and subjective, as the question 263
of
when life begins is "indeterminable as a legal matter."
Further, the fetus could not objectively be a "separate"
being if it is dependent on the woman to survive. 264 Such
ideological requirements are "unrelated to any legitimate
state interest in regulating the practice of medicine" and
thus fail to pass constitutional muster. 265 The majority
opinion "presupposes that all speech is demonstrably either
true or false, overlooking
the vast expanse of ideas that lie
'266
beyond means of proof.
Finally, the dissent concluded that the law's requirement
that doctors certify that the patient has understood the
information "does not provide a realistic opportunity for the
S..

259. Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 735-36
(8th Cir. 2008).
260. Id. at 736.
261. Id. at 737.
262. Id. at 740-41 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
263. Id. at 745.
264. Id. at 744.
265. Id. at 743.
266. Id. at 746.
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expression of alternate views" and thus limits their ability
to dissociate themselves from a state message with which
they might disagree. 267 Even if this were not the case,
"Iv]iews articulated by a doctor in the course of face to face
contact with a patient ... are, if anything, more likely to be
attributed to the speaker than the well known slogan
affixed to a state issued license plate. '268 Given this line of
reasoning, there was a reasonable enough chance that
Planned Parenthood would prevail to allow a preliminary
269
injunction.
Because Rounds II found that the information in this
case was truthful and non-misleading, 270 it presumably did
not contradict the Rounds I holding that requiring doctors
to provide subjective information is more constitutionally
problematic than requiring objective information. 271
However, the dissent's discussion of the subjectivity of the
information required by the South Dakota law 272 raises
questions about how extreme an information requirement
must be before a court will recognize it as ideological.
Without such recognition, it is more difficult to trigger
constitutional scrutiny. In addition, the court is less likely
to consider the question of opportunities for speaker
disassociation or counter-speech if it finds the required
information to be truthful. The promise of Rounds I was
unfortunately lost when the Rounds II majority failed to
recognize distortion and disregarded its consequences.
3. Signaling Distortion. In Rounds, regardless of
whether leaving counter-speech as the only remedy to
distortion was constitutionally sufficient, it was at least
feasible under the circumstances. In other cases, it is often
not practical or possible to expose distortion. For example,
in National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, a group of
artists claimed, inter alia, that the federal law governing
funding for the arts was overbroad under the First
267. Id.
268. Id. at 747.
269. Id. at 753.
270. Id. at 735-36 (majority opinion).
271. Rounds I, 467 F.3d at at 722-24; see generally Planned Parenthood
Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 2008).
272. Rounds II, 530 F.3d at 740-46.
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Amendment. 273 The standards used to award competitive
artistic grants were merit, excellence, and "decency and
respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American
public. '274 The Supreme Court upheld the funding scheme,
finding that it did not constitute viewpoint discrimination
and that the government was acting as patron rather than
regulator. 275 Bezanson and Buss state that it seems less
likely in Finley than in Rust that the government has
27 6
monopolized a part of the marketplace of ideas.
Nonetheless, they observe:
[T]he indecency consideration might influence the expression of
artists who hope to receive federal subsidies. Yet the viewing
public will ordinarily not know that such an influence has taken
place and, thus, . . . [they] will assume that . . . [the art]
represent[s] the unmodified expression of individual artists ...
[T]he government's vague anti-indecency message, expressed
through individual artistic authorship, would be effectively
2 77
hidden.

How could this distortion be communicated to the public?
Bezanson and Buss suggest that artists or exhibit
organizers might post signs next to funded works of art in
exhibits. 278 It might also be possible to launch a media
campaign or to run advertisements in major media outlets.
"It is doubtful, however, whether there will be a strong
motive to provide these clarifying communications or, if
they are made, whether they would be effective'279
in removing
the distortion caused by the government's role.
Given the constraints of Title X-funded projects, how
might health providers in Rust make their patients aware
of the distortion? Title X expressly forbade them from
discussing abortion when using Title X funding. 280 One
possibility might be meticulous bookkeeping (as Justice
273. 524 U.S. 569, 569 (1998).
274. Id.
275. Id. at 571.
276. Bezanson & Buss, supra note 36, at 1460.
277. Id. at 1460-61.
278. Id. at 1462.
279. Id.

280. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 177-80 (1991).
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Blackmun suggested in his dissenting opinion) and clear
separation of Title X and non-Title X services. 28 ' Also, a
non-Title X provider could make patients aware of her
presence and tell them to speak to her if they wished to
discuss abortion. Bezanson and Buss suggest that prochoice advocates could stand outside clinics and distribute
information about abortion services. 28 2 All of these methods
are possible; it is less clear how much they will counteract
the government's distortion of the marketplace of ideas. 28 3
Courts should monitor the potential of government speech
to cause distortion in each case and evaluate whether there
are practical ways to address it. Whenever possible, courts
could choose a resolution that minimizes this impact.
Seeking to minimize distortion will not resolve the
problem completely. A free and robust exchange of ideas
exists only in theory; in real-life settings, factors like social
inequality, power imbalances, and simple lack of will make
it unlikely that removing specific government-imposed
barriers to speech will guarantee that it is heard. In the
specific context of abortion counseling, health care
providers often have a personal motivation and professional
obligation to present all options to patients, making it likely
that more information would be available to patients in the
absence of government-imposed limits. However, in many
or even most situations, one cannot be sure that listeners
would receive full information absent the specific
government distortion in the case at hand.
Cass Sunstein has observed that courts often favor the
common law status quo and government neutrality or
inaction out of a sense that they are preserving a kind of
"natural" social order whose manipulation would raise

281. Id. at 214 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see supra note 189.
282. Bezanson & Buss, supra note 36, at 1397.
283. Also, it would be useful to determine whether the amount of burden on
the counter-speaker should affect the constitutional analysis; should some very
high level of burden be considered constitutionally equivalent to banning
counter speech outright? The Rust situation is also further complicated by the
fact that the government is denying patients access not just to information
about other options, but to information about an option that is itself a
constitutionally protected right. But see supra note 183.
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constitutional concerns. 28 4 This view does not recognize that
current social conditions or organization may themselves be
the product of past laws, policies, or cultural assumptions,
so it is problematic to use common law as the baseline when
analyzing constitutional challenges. In the context of the
First Amendment, regulation of "powerful private speakers"
could actually enhance freedom of speech, but such an
approach
would wreak havoc with existing first amendment doctrine ....
[T]he central commitment of the first amendment . . . is to
neutrality on the basis of content or viewpoint .... The problem of
deciding who is powerful and who is not is too manipulable and too
factors to be the basis for
likely to be skewed by impermissible
285
first amendment doctrine.

Because there is no simple way to resolve this dilemma, the
best workable solution remains for courts to minimize
governmental exclusion of any speaker from the speech
market.
4. Dimensions of Distortion: Deep Capture. The public
may assume that a desire to protect public health based on
objective evaluation of current scientific evidence motivates
government speech. The public is also likely aware that if a
health issue becomes controversial, the government also
will have political motivations for its stance. Citizens might
not be aware of the extent of external influence on the
government about seemingly less controversial health
issues. The term "capture" is used to describe situations in
which a branch of government has a close relationship 2to
86
third parties, often representatives of a large industry.
Due to industry lobbying and support in the form of

284. Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 882 (1987).

Sunstein suggests that this concept originated in the famous Lochner case (now
overturned) in which the Court struck down a New York law limiting the
working hours of bakers because it interfered with the right to contract and
there was no direct relationship between the law and the state's health
objective. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
285. Sunstein, supra note 284, at 914-15. This also invokes Kathleen
Sullivan's point, discussed supra,that if social conditions are unjust it does not
follow that the government should be the entity specially empowered to remedy
the injustice. See supra text accompanyingnote 158.
286. GEORGE STIGLER, MEMOIRS OF AN UNREGULATED ECONOMIST 8 (1988).
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financial contributions or increased political power,
government law and policies often reflect the interests of
industry rather than of the people at large. 287 For example,
the design and content of the United States Department of
Agriculture's well-known "Food Pyramid" is heavily
influenced by the meat and dairy industries and 2does
not
88
reflect objectively accurate nutritional information.
The term "deep capture" refers to a scenario in which
an outside entity has a powerful influence not only over the
situation but also over the way in which the situation is
analyzed and perceived. 289 An industry might strongly
influence how the public perceives a public health issue,
drawing attention away from "industry-shaped social
conditions and beliefs" that actually cause health risks or
impede solutions to health problems. 290 Governmental
distortion of speech may obscure not only the government's
hidden influence, but also that of unknown powerful
entities completely immune from the political process,
making it all the more compelling for courts to be aware of
the potential for distortion and its effects on the speech
market.
B. Deception
Underlying
modern
conceptions
of the
First
Amendment is an assumption that more speech is always
better. In the marketplace of ideas, bad ideas will
eventually lose, so the harm they might cause is
outweighed by avoiding the exclusion of good ideas from the
marketplace, particularly when it is not always initially
obvious which ideas are good or bad. At least in theory, a
similar ideal guides scientific inquiry: all hypotheses are
equal until some become accepted as theory after passing
287. This why some commentators claim that political accountability to
voters in general is an illusion. It also has serious implications for commercial
speech because the government is unlikely to regulate the advertising of an
industry that has "captured" it. See, e.g., Yosifon, supra note 32.
288. MARION NESTLE, FOOD POLITICS 51-66 (2003).

289. Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the
Situational Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture,
152 U. PA. L. REV. 129, 218 (2003).
290. Alderman et al., supra note 155, at 102; see also Hanson & Yosifon,
supra note 289, at 220-23.
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the rigors of the scientific method. Because scientific data
informs and shapes it, public health policy might follow a
similar model of encouraging open debate about issues until
a particular policy emerges as the successful one that the
government should endorse. In fact, the goals behind public
health policy often provide an incentive for the government
to actively suppress ideas and engage in deception.2 91
When the government speaks in a public health
context, it often does so in the role of health educator, both
directly though the press, reports, and schools, and
indirectly through its policies, laws, and programs.
Improving the public's knowledge about health issues is a
goal of such speech, but it is not the only goal. It would
make little sense to have a public well-versed in health
matters if the population remained unhealthy; ultimately,
the goal of public health policy is actually to improve
health. Leonard H. Glantz wonders if the goal of public
health programs is "to have a citizenry that behaves the
way public health agencies think people ought to behave or
a citizenry that has enough information to make
knowledgeable choices. ' 292 As Daniel I. Wikler explains,
"when health education programs are evaluated, they are
not judged . . . in proportion to their success in inducing
belief. Rather, evaluators look at behavior change, the
actions which, they hope, would stem from th[o]se
beliefs. '293 This focus creates an incentive for the
government not to be forthcoming with all relevant
information because ultimately it wishes to create a change
291. In their work, Bezanson and Buss use the term "deception" to mean
"avoid[ing] fully disclosing that the government is behind the communication in
question." Bezanson & Buss, supra note 36, at 1491. This article will use the
term to describe a situation in which the government withholds information
when developing policy or communicating messages to the public.
292. Leonard H. Glantz, Control of Personal Behavior and the Informed
Consent Model, in KENNETH R. WING ET AL., PUBLIC HEALTH LAW 507, 511
(2007). As an example, Glantz asks, "[S]hould the goal of public health be to
ensure that nobody smokes cigarettes, or should the goal be to ensure that
everybody knows the risks of cigarette smoking ... ?" Id. This example seems
out of place in this context because smoking is addictive. When addiction is
involved, people often cannot make their behavior conform to their knowledge,
so a public health focus on behavior rather than education seems much more
appropriate.
293. Daniel I. Wikler, Persuasion and Coercion for Health: Ethical Issues in
Government Efforts to Change Life-Styles, 56(3) HEALTH & SOC'Y. 303, 328
(1978).
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in behavior; it will have an incentive only to disseminate
the information it believes is likely to induce the desired
effect. Health education is merely the means employed to
achieve this end rather than an end in itself. Health
programs are not merely providing information but also
"manipulating attitude and motivation. 294 Wikler even
suggests that "health education may call for actual and
deliberate misinformation: directives may imply or even
state that the scientific evidence in favor of a given health
practice is unequivocal even when it is not. ' 295 Glantz
agrees that if goals296are behavioral, "truth-telling could be
counterproductive."
Compounding this problem, Wikler observes, is that the
general consensus about public health measures tends to
have a moral undertone. 297 "The intrusion of non-medical
values is evidenced by the fact that of all of the living habits
that affect health adversely, only those that are sins ... are
mentioned as targets for change. Skiing and football
produce injuries as surely as sloth produces heart disease..
• ."298 Likewise, Glantz notes that much of what we would
now call health behaviors (for example, drinking alcohol)
originally entered the legal realm as moral issues and that
historically the two were often intertwined. 299 He states that
public health interventions should be based on scientific
evidence, which could
minimize hidden or subconscious
30 0
motivations.
moral
The marijuana advertisement in Ridley provides an
example of these concerns. 301 Although experts have
recently recognized drug addiction as a disease requiring
treatment, the public historically condemned it as a moral
failing and considered drug addicts to be "bad" people. In
Ridley, the court believed that the real reason the MBTA
rejected the advertisement was "distaste" for the views it

294. Id
295. Id. at 329.
296. Glantz, supra note 292, at 511.
297. Wikler, supra note 293, at 316.
298. Id.
299. Glantz, supra note 292, at 508.
300. Id.
301. Ridley v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 390 F.3d 65 (1st Cir. 2004).
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expressed; 302 the court may have suspected a moral
judgment behind the MBTA's refusal to run the
advertisement. In any case, even if the government had no
moral motivation, its incentive for deception in this
situation is high. As discussed earlier, from a public health
standpoint there may be good arguments on both sides of
the legalization issue, but there is strong scientific evidence
that using marijuana is harmful to one's health.3 03 If the
government's goal is to discourage marijuana use and it
determined that this advertisement undermined that goal,
particularly by using a rational-sounding argument about
legalization to disguise a more subtle pro-use message, then
the government should logically reject it.
There may have been an even more compelling reason
for the MBTA to reject this particular advertisement
because the text read in part, "Marijuana is NOT cocaine or
"304If the government's goal is
heroin. Tell us the truth . ..".
to prevent marijuana use, it would prefer not to tell the
truth in this situation. Admitting that marijuana is not as
harmful as other drugs might make it appear to be safer
than it is or lead someone to believe that it is unlikely to
cause the types of problems that heroin and cocaine cause.
It is true both that marijuana is harmful and that
marijuana is not as harmful as heroin or cocaine, but the
government has an incentive to disseminate only the former
message while suppressing the latter.30 5 If the government
wants to discourage marijuana use, especially among

302. Id. at 87-88.
303. Using marijuana for specific medical purposes, as in Conant v. Walters,
309 F.3d 629 (9th Cir. 2002), could enhance health, but this type of use was not
at issue in Ridley, 390 F.3d 65.
304. Ridley, 390 F.3d at 73.
305. The government is not the only public health speaker with a motive to
deceive in this context. For example, the American Cancer Society's oft-quoted
statistic that 1 in 8 women will get breast cancer is based on the risk that a
female infant will get the disease at some point in her lifetime. WING ET AL.,
supra note 292, at 516. In comparison, the actual risk for women ages 30-39 is 1
in 229 and for women ages 60-69 is 1 in 26, leading some critics to charge that
the society was manipulating the statistic to sound more alarming. Id. at 517.
The American Cancer Society maintained that it was doing a public service by
calling patients' attention to the disease, thus encouraging prevention and
screening. Id.
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teenagers prone to risk-taking, it has
a strong motivation to
30 6
resort to deception in this situation.
In his dissent in Rust, Justice Blackmun observed, "It is
crystal clear that the aim of the challenged provisions-an
aim the majority cannot help noticing-is not simply to
ensure that federal funds are not used to perform abortions,
but to 'reduce the incidence of abortion."' 30 7 Such a goal is
hardly unique among public health measures, but Justice
Blackmun was correct to be concerned about the First
Amendment implications of this type of purpose. When a
public health goal has a primarily moral dimension, First
Amendment concerns are paramount and courts should
apply them with full force. Even when there is no moralitydriven motivation, courts must be alert for deception
antithetical to the First Amendment.
This situation might seem to involve a direct conflict
between free speech values, which favor full information
and the free flow of ideas, and public health goals, which
may justify deception with the equally valuable interest of
protecting the public from danger and disease. 308 Upon
further reflection, however, these two types of interests
might not be in conflict after all. Free speech can promote
public health as much as interfere with it, so the free flow 309
of
ideas may better serve public health in the long term.
Also, governmental deception exposed in one situation may
undermine trust in the government in other contexts, which
could have a negative net impact on health goals. Finally,
there may be some public health issues in which there are
both benefits to and risks of each potential course of action.
In these circumstances, sharing full information is the only
way to allow individuals to make an informed choice or to
306. However, deception about one issue may decrease the government's
credibility about other issues, potentially reducing its motivation to deceive. See
infra text accompanying note 309.
307. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 216 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(quoting 42 C.F.R. § 59.2 (1990)).
308. Also, justifications for public health interventions are often criticized as
being paternalistic, a problem not faced by First Amendment absolutists.
309. Parmet & Smith, supra note 32, at 406-07 ("[Blroad First Amendment
protection may be supportive, if not necessary, for the development of an
informational environment that safeguards public health.... [In the case of the
AIDS epidemic], the broad protections offered by the First Amendment helped
to ensure the availability of information that the public needed ...").
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explain the circumstances under which one option is
preferable to another.
C. Abuse of Power
Distortion and deception are closely related to underlying
concerns about governmental motives. Trust plays a key
role in the effectiveness of government speech. 310 Despite
the primary role of the government as a public health
speaker, overall public trust in the government may vary
over time. Like any other speaker, the government is not
always right, and to the extent that the public perceives
that its messages are inaccurate or incomplete, its voice will
carry less force. The government must always acknowledge
and take responsibility for its factual mistakes if it is to
retain its credibility and authority.
In addition, the United States government has a history
of morally dubious programs carried out in the name of
public health: Tuskegee, 3 11 Willowbrook, 312 the Jewish
Chronic Disease Hospital study, 31 3 and mass involuntary
sterilization of "undesirable" people 31 4 are among the
unfortunate incidents that cast a shadow on the
310. Id. at 391.
311. See, e.g., JAMES H. JONES, BAD BLOOD: THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS
EXPERIMENT (1993) (describing a forty-year federal government project
beginning in the 1930s that studied the progression of syphilis in a group of
African-American men who were left untreated for decades, even after
antibiotics became the widely available standard of care). President Clinton
later apologized to the study survivors for the government's behavior. Press
Release, The White House, Remarks by the President in Apology for Study Done
in Tuskegee (May 16, 1997), availableat http://www.cdc.gov/tuskegee/clintonp.htm.
312. See, e.g., DAVID J. ROTHMAN & SHEILA M. ROTHMAN, THE WILLOWBROOK
WARS (1984) (discussing how mentally retarded children in a New York State
institution were deliberately infected with hepatitis in the 1960s).
313. See, e.g., NATHAN HERSHEY & ROBERT D. MILLER, HUMAN
EXPERIMENTATION AND THE LAW 6-7 (1976) (describing a federally funded study
in 1963 in which live cancer cells were injected into indigent elderly patients
without their knowledge or consent).
314. E.g., Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (authorizing forced sterilization
of Carrie Buck, a "feeble-minded" woman). Carrie Buck was in fact of normal
intelligence. In this case "feeble-minded" implied sexually promiscuous, but
Buck was pregnant as the result of a rape. In the half century following this
case, the U.S. government involuntarily sterilized more than 60,000 Americans.
Paul A. Lombardo, Three Generations, No Imbeciles: New Light on Buck v. Bell,
60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 30, 31, 53-54 (1985).
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government's motivations. As a result of programs like
these, some segments of the population remain highly
suspicious of governmental health interventions and resist
government involvement in community public health
issues. 315
Some commentators have also pointed out that, in the
wake of fears about terrorism and governmental
preparedness, plans to address a major public health issue
like an infectious pandemic reveal an attitude that is at
best disturbing and at worst unconstitutional. "Given the
data from real world events, public opinion surveys, and
mock exercises, it is quite remarkable that some public
health officials are still at home with draconian nineteenth'316
century quarantine and compulsory treatment methods.
Public health officials often have a mindset that protecting
the public effectively means erring on the side of restricting
those who may not pose a threat to others, but this view is
at odds with legal standards and cultural norms. "[A]buse
of power17 will predictably destroy public trust and instill
panic."3
A similar argument can be made in the context of free
speech. Some public health authorities may believe that
controlling information is the best way to protect citizens,
and in a limited sense they may be right, but the potential
for paternalism and abuse in such a situation is obvious.
Further, if the public knows or suspects that the
government is withholding information, trust in the
government will erode, undermining both its authority and
effectiveness. This loss of confidence in government will
have long-term consequences that can only have an overall
negative impact on public health. In times of public health
emergency, the temptation to subvert other concerns to
health will be strong, but it is in such moments that it is
most important to recognize constitutional rights like free
speech. Protecting these rights during a crisis is the way a
315. For example, the media has reported that due to the legacy of incidents
like Tuskegee, many African-Americans do not trust the government to protect
their health. JONES, supra note 311, at 220. As a result, some AfricanAmericans believe that HIV/AIDS and associated preventive measures "are part
of a conspiracy to wipe out the black race." Id. at 221.
316. George J. Annas, The Statue of Security: Human Rights and Post-9/11
Epidemics, 38 J. HEALTH L. 319, 341 (2005).
317. Id.
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culture expresses its conviction that such rights are
fundamental rather than formalities.
VI. GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS OUTSIDE
THE PUBLIC HEALTH CONTEXT

The protection of public health is only one of the
government's many functions. In some cases the
government seeks to suppress the health messages of others
not because they conflict with is own health goals but
because they interfere with other governmental functions
that it prioritizes in a particular situation. In AIDS Action
Committee v. Massachusetts Bay TransportationAuthority,
the MBTA ran a series of seven AIDS prevention public
service advertisements created by the AIDS Action
Committee
("AAC"), a non-profit AIDS education
organization. 318 These advertisements featured pictures of
condoms and contained sexual innuendo in the text, and the
MBTA received more than thirty-six complaints. 319 A year
later, the MBTA developed an advertising guideline policy
which stated, in part, that it would follow statutory
guidelines for broadcast and private sector advertising,
meaning that it would accept advertisements only if the
average
person
applying contemporary
community
standards would not find that they appealed to a "prurient
interest" and if the advertisements did not offensively
describe sexual conduct as defined in the statute. 320 The
MBTA also would not accept advertisements that contained
graphic messages or representations of sexual conduct. 32 '
Later that year, AAC submitted a new series of
advertisements. 322 Under the new policy, the MBTA
rejected some of these and requested revisions of others
based on their sexual content. 323 AAC refused to make the
revisions and sued the MBTA, citing First Amendment

318. 42 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1994).
319. Id.
320. Id. at 3-4.

321. Id. at 4.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 4-5.
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violations among its claims. 324 The MBTA defended its
rejection of the advertisements based on not offending a
captive audience of MBTA riders and on protecting children
from their sexual content, although its policy did not
mention either of these issues. 325 AAC said it had used a
particular type of sexual humor because it had proven
effective with the target audience, and it presented letters
of support from the state Department of Public Health, the
governor, and the Assistant U.S. Surgeon General affirming
the value of its approach. 326 The court also pointed out that
the MBTA had run advertisements for the movie "Fatal
Instinct" with similar sexual innuendos around
the same
327
time that it rejected the AAC advertisements.
The First Circuit did not determine which type of forum
the advertising space was, but it rejected the MBTA's claim
that the refusal was based on a content-neutral, narrowly
tailored manner regulation. 328 A manner restriction must
be content neutral, but this policy discriminated based on
the content of the advertisements. 329 The court explained
that it was difficult to forbid "sexually explicit or patently
3 30
offensive" expression without banning content as well.
Most significantly, the MBTA had accepted other
advertisements with sexual innuendo, which was a
violation of content neutrality. 331 The court found that the
"Fatal Instinct" advertisements were at least as explicit and
more visually provocative than those of AAC. 332 The court
believed that the MBTA had rejected AAC's advertisements
because they generated controversy, but ultimately the
324. Id. at 5.
325. Id. at 5-6.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 5.
328. Id. at 8-9.
329. Id. at 8-9.
330. Id.
331. Id. at 9-13.
332. Id. at 10. In addition, the court noted that the "Fatal Instinct"
advertisements were less protected under the First Amendment because, unlike
AAC's advertisements, they were commercial speech. Id. Neither the parties nor
the court appeared to recognize that this film was a parody of other popular
movies such as "Basic Instinct" and "Fatal Attraction" and thus the sexual
content of the advertisements was meant to be tongue-in-cheek.
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reason did not matter. 333 This kind of content
gave the appearance of viewpoint
discrimination
discrimination, so it would be prohibited even if the MBTA's
advertising space were a non-public forum. 334 The MBTA
might be able to ban sexual innuendo, but it must do so in a
the lower
neutral fashion.3 35 Therefore, the court upheld
336
court's injunction against the MBTA policy.

In National Abortion Federation v. Metropolitan
Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority, the National Abortion
pro-choice
to
place
sought
("NAF")
Federation
advertisements on city buses run by the Metropolitan
Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority ("MARTA").337 MARTA
refused to accept them based on its policy not to accept any
advertisement that "supports or opposes any position in
regard to a matter of public controversy," defined as an
issue widely covered by media that "arouses strong feelings
in a substantial number of people." 338 A federal district
court in Georgia found that MARTA had consistently
rejected political advertisements but had accepted a wide
range of advertisements on socially controversial topics
such as AIDS awareness and gay rights.339 It had also
accepted advertisements for pregnancy and adoption
centers. 340 Therefore, the court found that MARTA's
advertising space was a public forum. 341 MARTA claimed
an interest in protecting passengers from violence, but the
court found that the risk of violence was too remote to be
compelling here because MARTA had not shown that there
was a credible threat or that violence had erupted in other
cities that had accepted the advertisements. 342 Therefore,
MARTA's content-based rejection of the advertisements
333. Id. at 12.
334. See id. at 11-12.
335. Id. at 13.
336. Id.
337. Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v. Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 112 F.
Supp. 2d 1320 (N.D. Ga. 2000).
338. Id. at 1324.
339. Id. at 1326.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Id. at 1327.
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could not stand. 343 The court also found that MARTA's
policy was void for vagueness and implied that344it was overly
broad, granting NAF a permanent injunction.
It does not appear in either of these cases that the
government's motivation for rejecting the advertisements
was related to an underlying health agenda; MARTA and
the MBTA simply wanted to avoid controversy. In fact, in
the MBTA case several other branches of government had
endorsed the advertisements, 345 creating an unusual
situation in which the MBTA stood in opposition to
divisions of the government specifically charged with
protecting the public health. In contrast to Ridley, here the
MBTA is no "extension of the school house"346 but simply a
transportation authority trying to maximize revenue and
minimize hassle by avoiding offending its riders; it felt no
obligation to further AAC's public health goals. It is not
clear why the MBTA took a different stance in AIDS Action
than in Ridley a decade later, but in any case the different
reasons it gave for rejecting the advertisements had very
different public health implications. In both AIDS Action
and NAF v. MARTA, First Amendment and public health
values are in harmony with each other.
VII. SUMMARY
Of the many voices speaking about public health in the
marketplace of ideas, the government's voice will always be
distinctive. Because its opinion carries so much weight, and
because it is specially charged with the protection of public
health, the government must be able to determine its own
message. The government needs not only the obvious ability
to choose what it will say but also the ability to distinguish
its message from those of others. Whenever it is
constitutionally permissible, courts should allow the
government wide latitude to decline to become a vehicle for
speech that contradicts its own. In a case like Christ's

343. Id.
344. Id. at 1327-28.
345. AIDS Action Comm. of Mass. v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 42 F.3d 1, 5-6
(1st Cir. 1994).
346. Ridley v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 390 F.3d 65, 84 (1st Cir. 2004); see
supranote 101.
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Bride, where the government is trying to prevent the
dissemination of inaccurate information to the public, it
does not appear to be doing so as a pretext for viewpoint
discrimination, and there is a reasonable fear that some
form of government endorsement, however removed, may
be implied, the state should be allowed to decline the use of
its resources to broadcast another's message.
Courts must also recognize that the government alone
can regulate others and isolate itself from market forces
that constrain other speakers. The government as speaker
has the power to distort the speech market and to deceive
listeners. An ideal solution would be to require the
government to alert listeners about distortion and
deception, but such a requirement is not possible. There are
no legal grounds for mandating such action by the
government, and even if there were such grounds, there is
not always an obvious way to indicate that distortion or
deception might be present.
A more realistic approach is for courts to prevent the
government from blocking other avenues of communication
as it sends its own message. For example, in abortion
information cases like Casey and Rounds, the government
can mandate that truthful information be given, but it
should not be able to prevent medical personnel from
adding their own views. To the extent that courts find a
requirement that medical personnel themselves deliver the
state's message unconstitutional, the state might appoint a
specific agent to deliver its own message. Rust is a more
difficult situation because it involves government funding;
courts could not require the government to pay for speech it
does not endorse. Intricate physical arrangements and
complex bookkeeping might be the only solution to this
problem, although it would be of limited use in a situation
in which third parties lack the inclination to call patients'
attention to the message they are not hearing.
Cases like Conant and Rounds I are good examples of
how courts can recognize the potential for distortion and, on
free speech grounds, limit governmental restrictions or
mandates on others' speech. Ridley demonstrates that,
although a court should give a state's public health
concerns due consideration, they will not always outweigh
free speech concerns, particularly when there is viewpoint
discrimination and a possible ulterior motive for the state
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to suppress others' speech. As Justice O'Connor
demonstrated in her Ashcroft dissent, sometimes a
compromise between the two is possible.
Finally, because the government has many functions, it
may sometimes suppress others' public health speech not
because the government opposes the message or prefers to
convey its own message but because it is asserting an
interest other than protecting the public health. In such
cases First Amendment and public health arguments tend
to be aligned, so applying traditional First Amendment
neutrality and reasonableness tests should provide a
satisfactory resolution.
CONCLUSION

Government speech plays a critically important role in
communicating health information and in shaping the
public's health beliefs and behavior. When the government's
duty to protect the public health seems either to conflict
with or to complicate its duty not to restrict the speech of
others, judges should not completely disregard public
health in favor of free speech concerns. Courts traditionally
have not included health concerns in First Amendment
analysis. This discussion has identified three categories of
free speech and health cases and explained how courts can
consider the public health implications of their decisions in
each.
Free speech and public health need not be in opposition
to one another, nor is it necessary to rewrite First
Amendment jurisprudence to integrate public health and
free speech concerns. When courts view cases from a public
health perspective, both the benefits and risks of
governmental power become clearer. It is necessary for the
government to be able to choose and communicate its own
message without being forced to provide a means of
promoting others' viewpoints. On the other hand, because
the government holds a great deal of power over speech
markets in general and public health dialogue in particular,
courts must limit its ability to distort or suppress ideas in
the many circumstances in which others' speech will not be
attributed to the government. In the long term, a speech
market in which the government's own clearly delineated
message co-exists with the ideas of others is the best
arrangement to promote both public health and free speech.

